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INTRODUCTION 
by Tijo Salverda, Andrea Hollington, Sinah 
Kloß, Nina Schneider and Oliver Tappe (GSSC) 
 
In a pessimistic – or realistic – mood, it is hard 
to deny that the world’s future looks rather grim: 
growing inequality appears difficult to undo; the 
financial system has hardly become safer since 
the 2007/2008 crisis; and the rising power of 
BRICS and other Global South economies 
tends to rely on conventional economic and 
ecologically destructive growth models. At the 
same time, and nurturing a more positive mood, 
we are increasingly witnessing efforts to turn 
the tide of the current economic predicament: 
more inclusive forms of capitalism; ethical con-
sumption; and alternative approaches to eco-
nomic growth.  
 
In this issue of Voices from Around the World 
we present a number of thoughts on alterna-
tives to current forms of global capitalism, and 
considerations as to whether and how these 
may evolve. Increasingly we understand that 
existing economic orthodoxy does not offer a 
sufficient understanding of, or solutions to, the 
challenges we face. Even mainstream thinkers 
realise that current economic models have a 
variety of destructive tendencies, particularly 
regarding inequality, resource depletion, pollu-
tion and so forth.  
 
Of course, concerns about the destructive char-
acter of capitalism are not new. Nevertheless, 
these concerns may gain new momentum, for 
example with the Occupy movement, the rise of 
politicians such as Jeremy Corbyn and Bernie 
Sanders in the wake of it, and an IMF that real-
ises that there can be such a thing as ‘too much 
austerity’. At the same time, however, there is 
still much left to be desired. Wolfgang Streeck, 
in a recent interview, rightly questions the effec-
tiveness of moral counterfactuals when it re-
mains unexplained why many of these have not 
long ago become facts. The concerns raised in 
this issue, then, should also be considered as a 
plea for more fundamental research into which 
forces and logics prevent counterfactuals from 
becoming the norm. A better understanding of 
this may actually help to improve tactics and 
strategies aimed at fairer and more sustainable 
outcomes.  
 
We also have to be realistic about the fact that 
change takes time. David Graeber refers to the 
delay that exists between protests and change, 
which he defines in an interview as the ‘3.5 
years historical lag’. Though the timeframe may 
differ from situation to situation, his point is of 
relevance. Beliefs about economics and/or poli-
tics may be gradually transformed on the basis 
of counterfactuals. Five years from now the 
setup may look rather different from what we 
currently think is possible – partly as a result of 
opposition building up at the moment. Hence, 
corporations cannot singlehandedly ignore the 
pressure they face, notwithstanding that, as 
Streeck argues, business may not be intimidat-
ed enough at the moment to accept constraints 
on its power. 
 
Why, for example, would a multinational corpo-
ration like Coca-Cola care about labour condi-
tions, the environment, ‘land grab’, and other 
issues that may be deemed external to its eve-
ryday business practices? They may fear con-
sumer boycotts or potentially stricter and bind-
ing regulation. Yet, to assume that capitalists 
are bad guys by definition, are all-powerful, or 
that they will always use what power they have 
to protect ‘free markets’, is ignoring the histori-
cal record. Even when change is limited, more 
detailed investigations are needed into which 
discourses and actions businesses, multina-
tional corporations and so forth fear, and how 
they evaluate them. Hence, Jessica Sklair’s 
plea in this issue to seek to understand and 
analyse those  in power is significant. Without 
this, it may be harder to successfully pressure 
and/or convince them to work towards more 
equal and less destructive outcomes.  
 
Nobody believes that this is an easy task – not 
least because civil society increasingly faces 
repression around the world. But as most of the 
contributions in this issue illustrate, hope re-
mains. The various authors do not pretend that 
they have the solution, or believe that transfor-
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mation will occur without obstacles, but they 
hope that their thoughts may help to contribute 
to solutions to the current challenges. Their 
contributions range from more general sugges-
tions for systemic change, to illustrating the 
realities on the ground, which are often rather 
different from what economic textbooks sug-
gest. Some present personal reflections, while 
others discuss global capitalist structures. To a 
certain extent here we are also making use of 
the power of repetition, as a number of them 
have been published elsewhere, but sometimes 
we need a message to be repeated in order to 
really take it in and act upon it. Taken both to-
gether and individually, we hope that the contri-
butions offer insightful analyses of the current 
predicament, as well as potential solutions.  
 
Contributions 
In reflection on the issue’s title, Patrick Nevel-
ing’s discussion of hope provides a relevant 
starting point. He illustrates that hope is always 
paradoxical, since it is about both the impossi-
bilities and the possibilities. It is, moreover, on 
intimate terms with despair. Indeed, while many 
hope for change – and may actually see change 
happening – there remains much to despair 
about. Furthermore, one person’s hope may be 
another’s despair, as Neveling illustrates in a 
more detailed analysis of post-crisis Ireland.   
 
It is not necessarily difficult to decide whose 
hope to favour, though. Fair and democratic 
societies should favour the wishes of the majori-
ty while respecting the lives and hopes of mi-
norities. With the 2007/2008 financial crisis still 
fresh in mind, Bill Freund provides a general 
analysis of how global finance should be tamed. 
Only by nationalising large parts of the banking 
system, ensuring better-regulated stock mar-
kets, and dismantling tax havens can we work 
towards an economic system that serves socie-
ty instead of the other way around.  
 
Also, speaking for the African context, Keith 
Hart argues that African people should finally 
receive what they are due. To obtain this, he 
argues, the African countries should defend 
their interests collectively, instead of being sub-
jected to a racist world order that only allows 
foreign entities and a small number of Africans 
to reap the benefits of the continent’s wealth. 
The precipitous increase of the continent’s pop-
ulation alone may actually facilitate this, he ar-
gues. It is the numbers that count and, reflect-
ing on Frantz Fanon, Hart discusses the poten-
tial for a new African revolution. Hence, at the 
same time as the growth of the world population 
appears as a major concern, he presents an 
account of the emancipatory power of numerical 
preponderance. To succeed in turning the glob-
al system in their favour, however, an openness 
to collaborate with existing powers is required; 
David Graeber equally makes a plea in the 
above-mentioned interview for the radical left to 
collaborate with the institutional left in order to 
really come to meaningful change. 
 
The hope, of course, is that the growth of popu-
lations of the Global South does not go hand in 
hand with the same destructive growth that has 
been witnessed in the long-established econo-
mies of the Global North. This, however, is of-
ten rightly perceived as not allowing the Global 
South to enjoy the same privileges as many 
people of the Global North. Instead, Jason 
Hickel, in a discussion on the Sustainable De-
velopment Goals (SDGs), suggests that the 
most prosperous countries should ‘de-develop’. 
This, as Hickel realises, requires some con-
structive thinking about what terminology to 
apply. Economic growth tends to have a posi-
tive connotation, while de-developing appears 
too negative to sell. Yet, as he points out, many 
people in prosperous countries have embraced 
trends that represent alternative approaches to 
economic growth. If this can be framed in much 
more positive terms, current beliefs in econom-
ic, yet often destructive, growth models may be 
turned around. Resonating with Neveling’s con-
tribution, this should convey a sense of hope. 
Hope for lifestyles that embrace many of the 
joys of life, yet without continuing further along 
the one-way path towards destruction.    
 
Lorenzo Fioramonti, who also discusses the 
SDGs, sees them as a good starting point for 
radical change. He does not deny the limits of 
the SDGs, yet they also contain a number of 
leads that substantially differ from the past. 
There is an increasing acknowledgement of 
how different concerns are interrelated and can 
therefore only be solved by adopting an inte-
grated approach. To make use of them strategi-
cally, Fioramonti provides a number of tangible 
solutions for how to work towards more sus-
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tainable outcomes – and shed many of the de-
structive economic convictions, policies and 
performance metrics we currently rely on along 
the way. This all comes together in his Republic 
of Wellbeing, a metaphor for policy changes 
that is not only about hope but, according to 
him, also pragmatic and within reach.   
 
The integrated approach, as Paul Robert Gilbert 
illustrates in his contribution, should also be 
extended to the economic curricula. Both Hick-
el’s and Fioramonti’s suggestions for change 
will probably have most success when econom-
ic curricula are fundamentally changed. Gilbert, 
who is a member of the International Student 
Initiative for Pluralism in Economics, argues that 
only a pluralist understanding of economics 
provides us with the tools to organise econo-
mies to the benefit of all. Especially policymak-
ers should take stock of the limits of beliefs in 
market rationality for organising societies – after 
all, societies are more than just markets. This, 
Tijo Salverda argues, should be accompanied 
by increasing pressure on the state. As exam-
ples of pressure on corporations illustrate, op-
posing certain practices is not necessarily futile. 
Yet, he argues, we cannot rely on pressuring 
economic enterprises alone, since they can 
never offer an integrated approach for society’s 
needs. The state, with all its shortcomings, is 
required as a partner in mobilising change. 
When policymakers and other state actors start 
rethinking economic orthodoxy (voluntarily or 
under pressure) the Republic of Wellbeing may 
indeed be within reach.  
 
A good dose of realism is still required, howev-
er. In his analysis of solidarity movements in 
Greece, Theodoros Rakopoulos illustrates that 
these movements are certainly of relevance to 
overcoming some of the consequences of EU 
enforced austerity. Yet, contrary to what some 
may wish for, Rakopoulos illustrates that they 
are not sufficient for a generalised paradigm 
shift of the country’s political economy. Hence, 
in our wish for change, vigilance about what is 
actually happening is required. 
 
Mario Schmidt, in reflecting upon the work of 
Marcel Mauss, presents a critical account of the 
‘sharing economy’. In the face of concerns 
about free market capitalism, many believe that 
inequalities are best confronted by embracing 
the alternative ‘sharing economy’. Yet, as 
Schmidt illustrates, it is shortsighted to assume 
that sharing activities are inherently more so-
cialist than the individual purchase of goods, 
and thus the existence of money. If properly 
implemented, money may actually offer a better 
and more democratic entry point to change the 
world for the better.  
 
Supriya Singh, who contributes with both a per-
sonal note and an interview, also points to the 
qualities of money. In her personal discussion 
of the role of money in Indian and Australian 
families, she highlights the fact that money can 
have positive tendencies, and that it is not nec-
essarily impersonal and immoral as many critics 
present it to be. Moreover, as she argues in the 
interview, for many of the world’s most disen-
franchised, new and creative solutions for being 
included in monetary exchange may offer most 
hope. For example, mobile money like M-Pesa 
offers tremendous emancipatory power to the 
immense group of the unbankable in the Global 
South.  
 
Empirical investigations are, in other words, of 
central importance in understanding change 
and the potential for it. Resonating with Singh’s 
argument of the emancipatory power of mobile 
money, Laura Pargen and Peter Dannenberg 
illustrate that producing for (international) mar-
kets, too, is not inherently negative. In the case 
of small-scale farmers in Kenya, hunger is not 
necessarily the prospect when producing cash 
crops for markets – both export and domestic. 
They illustrate that a combination of producing 
food and cash crops appears to offer most 
guarantees of avoiding hunger. More evidence-
based economics, their contribution indicates, 
also requires critical analyses of beliefs that 
markets, or money, are categorically bad. Just 
as many of the policies that are deemed neolib-
eral are grounded more in ideological beliefs 
about economics than evidence, the same can 
be said about much of the opposition to the 
catch-all term ‘neoliberalism’. That said, trends 
indentified as neoliberalist can have real im-
pacts.  
 
Giorgos Poulimenakos and Dimitris Dalakolgou 
illustrate that the recent terrorist attacks in Eu-
rope may partly be explained as being partly 
rooted in the exclusion of large parts of society 
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due to the increasing marketisation of society – 
and the depoliticisation that comes with it.  
 
Policymakers and the like should certainly take 
stock, since, as Gilbert’s contribution, already 
mentioned above, argues, realities on the 
ground often do not match the content of eco-
nomic textbooks and abstract discussions in the 
centres of power. In the case of female entre-
preneurs in Lesotho, Sean Maliehe points out 
that their practices have relatively little to do 
with dominant ideas about the homo economi-
cus. From this reality, he argues, lessons could 
be drawn for more inclusive economic models. 
Equally, Mallika Shakya shows in her study of 
Nepal that neoliberalism can be reversed. She 
witnesses a humanising drive with, for example, 
economic transactions that are not necessarily 
rooted in profit-seeking. Hence, in order to 
come to a more human idiom in the context of 
economic transformations, Shakya argues that 
we have to be more open to studying the empir-
ical realities, rather than relying too strongly on 
abstract discourses.       
 
In these empirical investigations, we cannot 
ignore those in power, as the above-mentioned 
reference to Jessica Sklair’s contribution has 
already indicated. In her analysis of philanthro-
py in Brazil, Sklair does not consider philan-
thropy to be a panacea for solving many of the 
world’s problems, despite what some may be-
lieve – or hope. After all, much of philanthro-
pists’ money results from exploitation and other 
capitalist excesses. Yet she shows that this 
should not blind us to the possibility that change 
may come ‘from within’– in her case, from 
young Brazilian elite philanthropists confronting 
the role of their elite group in the perpetuation of 
inequality. She shows, however, that these 
young philanthropists have to walk a fine line. 
At the same time as that they want to address 
their role in the perpetuation of inequality, they 
also have to avoid alienating their peers. To an 
outsider this slow pace of change can be frus-
trating, and additional external pressure and 
regulation is undoubtedly needed to readdress 
inequality. Yet, as Sklair argues, top-down ef-
forts should not be dismissed out of hand, in 
particular because when they are successful 
their impact may be huge.  
 
Finally, in our empirical analyses we should not 
neglect historical perspectives. John Bryden, in 
his insightful comparison of two prosperous 
societies, Scotland and Norway, argues that 
long-term trends and forgotten events are often 
of significance. As he shows, differences be-
tween the countries are also influenced by par-
ticular events that happened in the past. 
Though with a focus on two prosperous coun-
tries in the Global North, Bryden’s argument is 
of wider relevance to our understandings of 
current situations – and also with regard to un-
derstanding the perpetuation of incorrect eco-
nomic analyses. In addition, he warns against 
the dangers of essentialist views. There are 
often no singular universal causes that explain 
current conditions. The world we inhabit is often 
more complex than that, and, echoing Gilbert’s 
plea for a more pluralist economics, we should 
be much more open to the varieties, and the 
interplay, of causes and events.   
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HOPE’S GLOBAL SYSTEMIC PARADOX 
by Patrick Neveling (Department for Cultural 
Anthropology, Utrecht University) 
 
 “Paradoxically, hope is on intimate terms 
with despair. It asks for more than life promises. 
It is poised for disappointment’’ (Mattingly, 
2010, 3, cited in Throop, 2012, 175) 
 
Hope is an increasingly relevant concept in an-
thropology, not least since the 2008 financial 
crises initiated rapid socio-economic changes in 
the Western heartlands of the global system, 
where much of the discipline’s higher-ranked 
output comes from. 
 
As a topic, hope emerged in phenomenological 
anthropology. It has been widely discussed in 
works on morality since the 2000s. There, the 
debate has meanwhile overcome static under-
standings of hope “as either passive or active, 
or as the hope for a better future”. Instead, the 
anthropology of morality now understands hope 
as an ambivalent component of human subjec-
tivity-making (Zigon, 2009, 254). Hope is, as 
emphasized in the opening quote, always para-
doxical. For it points beyond what is achievable 
and is, not uncommonly, informed by past, pre-
sent, and future experiences and expectations 
of social and economic oppression (Throop, 
2012; Zigon, 2009). In sum, and irrespective of 
the circumstances, this understanding of human 
subjects’ hoping essentially acknowledges im-
possibilities as much as possibilities. 
 
So far, so good. However, as indicated above, 
because of rapid changes in the global system 
since the late 2000s, hope is now also of inter-
est to anthropologists more chiefly concerned 
with the making and unmaking of political econ-
omies. Several contributions to a recent special 
section in Comparative Studies of South Asia, 
Africa and the Middle East, for example, con-
sider hope a core aspect of the research and 
analysis on “Speculation: Futures and Capital-
ism in India” (see Bear et al., 2015). Hope, con-
ceived this way, is one of many possible tropes 
for anthropologists to capture the changes 
emerging from a “new political economy” 
(Appadurai, 2015, 484). If it is put on par with 
“dreamwork”, “speculation”, or “anticipation”, 
“hope” is nevertheless yet one more future-
oriented trope per se, which means that the 
concern for how humans think about and relate 
to temporality is fairly narrow, as the definition 
suggests. Furthermore, an economic anthropol-
ogy that regards hope mainly as an orientation 
towards the future may miss out on hope’s in-
herent ambivalences and paradoxes – qualities 
that are central in recent phenomenological 
anthropologies. The following moves these am-
bivalences and paradoxes to the centre of a 
systematic anthropology that seeks to critically 
engage the relevance of hope in past, present, 
and future global political economies. 
 
Ambivalent Crises and Global Systemic 
Centralization/Peripheralization 
Capitalism and its discontents have been high 
on public and academic agendas since a so-
called crisis hit the global system in the late 
2000s. The qualifier “so-called” is important 
here because the often-invoked state of all-out 
“crisis” does not correspond with the events on 
the ground since the late 2000s. As inequality 
proliferates the numbers of millionaires and 
billionaires is growing exponentially (important-
ly, in national economies with single-digit infla-
tion percentages) as is the number of house-
holds that have their properties “repossessed” 
by lenders. Thus, depending on a given individ-
ual’s position on these growth curves, the lives 
of others may appear to them as shaken by 
crisis and hardship or as boosted by burgeoning 
prosperity. Such positioning, then, should have 
considerable impact on the way a given individ-
ual or household frames their hopes, and I shall 
elaborate on what this means for anthropology’s 
analyses of hope below. 
 
Before I reflect on observations from fieldwork 
in the Republic of Ireland in the summer of 2010 
it is important to consider how changing socio-
economic stratification impacts on social units 
beyond the individual or household scale. As 
regards the global system, social scientists and 
historians have been debating changes in geo-
political and socio-economic stratification for 
some decades now. This is important to em-
phasize as the above declarations of a “new 
political economy” (Appadurai, 2015, 484) re-
vive foregone conceptions of globalization that 
drove mainstream anthropology into a some-
what teleological and tautological analysis of 
supposedly new socio-economic phenomena in 
the 1990s, when the very same phenomena – 
the mobility of capital investments and the flexi-
bility of manufacturing locations, for example – 
had existed for decades and even centuries 
(see Neveling, 2015b; Neveling, 2014). Instead, 
more sound analyses in the social sciences 
debated a global systemic re-orientation, with 
the lion’s share of global production and trade 
volumes moving from East Asia towards the 
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West around 1800 (Pomeranz, 2000) and back 
towards East Asia in the 2000s (Arrighi, 2002 
[1994]; Frank, 1998; Piketty, 2014). 
Such a reverse movement in the sharing of 
global trade obviously reshuffles the positioning 
of national economies. The rise of the BRICS 
nations (Brazil, Russian Federation, India, PR 
China, and South Africa) and the increasing 
relevance of the Group of the 20 highest-output 
national economies (as opposed to the earlier 
relevance of a Group of 8 such nations) are 
some of the many outcomes of this process, in 
which some national economies move from 
peripheral to semi-peripheral or from semi-
peripheral to core positions, while others move 
in the opposite direction. Structural adjustment 
policies in the aftermath of the sovereign debt 
crises emerging since 2008, for example, in-
creasingly question the semi-peripheral position 
of several European Union national economies, 
such as Greece, Spain, Portugal, and the Re-
public of Ireland.  
 
Thus, as for individuals and households, crisis 
may be the reality for these nation-states while 
the BRICS nations are in a period of systemic 
rise and, possibly, a consolidation thereof. This 
obviously does not mean that the hopes of all 
individuals and households in a given national 
economy are evenly affected by its global sys-
tems trajectory – a national economy undergo-
ing rapid peripheralization may have a consid-
erable number of individuals and households 
gaining. Wider socio-economic circumstances, 
such as a national economy’s past, present, 
and future positioning and trajectory in the 
global system, will, nevertheless, have an im-
pact on how individuals and households frame 
their hopes.  
 
One national economy on the decline in Europe 
is that of the Republic of Ireland, and I now as-
sess selected instances of hope that I encoun-
tered there during a period of two months’ field 
research in the summer of 2010.  
 
The Decline of Miraculous Factories in the 
Republic of Ireland 
The late summer of 2010 was when the near-
default of the Irish state wiped the slate clean of 
what for many years had been labelled the 
“Celtic Tiger”. Whereas upward and downward 
movements of stocks are framed as bull mar-
kets and bear markets, there exists an animal 
metaphor only for instances of national ascend-
ance in the global system. In the Irish case, the 
Celtic Tiger stands for the seemingly miraculous 
rise of a peripheral, impoverished European 
nation to become an economic powerhouse, 
which saw Dublin coming in third on the Forbes 
journal’s ranking of “Europe’s Best-Paid Cities” 
as late as 2009.1 I had moved to Dublin with my 
partner and our six-month-old daughter to re-
search an important aspect of that “tiger” – the 
establishment of export processing zones 
(EPZs) in the Republic of Ireland. This was part 
of a larger research project on the global spread 
from an initial EPZ (more recently labelled spe-
cial economic zones, SEZs) in 1947, emerging 
rather coincidentally in the US-dependency 
Puerto Rico, to around 3,500 EPZs with more 
than 70 million workers in more than 130 na-
tions in the late 2000s (Neveling, 2015a). 
 
The Republic of Ireland was of interest in this 
study for three reasons. First, the establishment 
of an EPZ by the Shannon Free Airport Devel-
opment Corporation (SFADCo) in 1959 is often 
seen as the cradle of the Irish economic boom. 
Leading Irish corporations such as Ryanair 
were founded in the Shannon zone and careers 
of Irish businesspeople with global influence, 
such as the Ryanair owner Tony Ryan and the 
current CEO Michael O’Leary, had started 
there. Second, SFADCo and the Shannon Free 
Trade Zone (free trade zone is one of many 
different labels used by nation-states for the 
EPZ model of export-oriented industrialisation) 
had been highly influential in the global spread 
of the EPZ development model – hosting UN-
funded training workshops and fellowships for 
development officials from dozens of nations in 
the Global South since the early 1970s 
(Neveling, 2015a). Until today, this model is 
largely based on a given nation-state hoping to 
generate substantial employment and flows of 
foreign direct investment by way of offering a 
fairly standardised set of investment incentives 
(tax and customs holidays, state-funded infra-
structure for industries, and advertisement 
campaigns praising well-educated and low-
waged female workers as highly suitable and 
docile employees) to multinational enterprise 
ventures in light-manufacturing industries and 
industrial and financial services. Third, and sim-
plified for the sake of brevity, SFADCo self-
promotion had over decades masked how this 
model had been acquired during survey mis-
sions to Puerto Rico and training from US con-
sultancy firm Arthur D. Little in the 1950s, and 
had instead created an impression that SFAD-
Co staff had made Shannon Airport the cradle 
of the EPZs worldwide. Therefore, the Shannon 
                                                
1 See: http://www.forbes.com/2009/08/21/europe-best-
paid-lifestyle-real-estate-cities-economy.html, last visited 
January 6, 2016. 
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zone is commonly listed as the world’s first 
(modern) EPZ in academic publications as well 
as UN and World Bank publications (e.g. 
Farole, 2011; United Nations Centre on 
Transnational Corporations and International 
Labour Organisation, 1988).  
 
Hope for ascendance in the global system, in 
other words, looms large when nation-states set 
up EPZs, and many aspects of such hope were 
evident during a three-day training workshop in 
Dublin, convened by the World Free Zones 
Convention (WFZC), which I attended as part of 
my research. Development officials and em-
ployees of national and local EPZ-agencies had 
travelled to Dublin from Bahrain, Bulgaria, Bra-
zil, Mexico, Jordan, South Africa and elsewhere 
to attend the WFZC workshop. The promise 
was that a team of five Irish consultants with 
decades of experience in setting up EPZs 
would teach them how to manage EPZs and 
how to maintain the zones’ life-cycles, moving 
across industrial sectors and export markets to 
counter the runaway character of investments in 
the zones with a constant influx of fresh inves-
tors.  
 
Elsewhere, I have compared the hopes for 
large-scale employment and blossoming indus-
trial areas that EPZs have generated across the 
globe since they entered the portfolio of devel-
opment economics, UN and World Bank survey 
missions, and modernisation theory more gen-
erally, with the hopes for the coming of global 
infrastructure such as air-landing strips, ports, 
and modern factories driving Melanesian cargo-
cult movements around the time of the Second 
World War (Neveling, 2014). The fact that the 
2010 WFZC workshop in Dublin discussed how 
to maintain an established infrastructure and 
not how to establish one underlines that hopes 
are not only expressed at global and national 
scales, but that hopes at these scales are in-
formed by reflections on national and global 
histories. Hopes, then, are inextricable from the 
past, the present, and the future in an individu-
al’s lifeworld as much as in the highly institu-
tionalised setting of consultancy for economic 
development with its guise of rationality based 
on quantifying past experiences.  
 
Another quality of hope, its confrontational po-
tential, came to the fore on the workshop’s third 
day, when the participants were given a tour to 
see the wonders of Irish industrial development 
policies. Our initial stop related to hopes of the 
present and for a better future. The Irish Devel-
opment Authority’s recent flagship industrial 
zone, the Grange Castle Corkagh Park in South 
Dublin County, in 2010 housed the European 
headquarters of Microsoft Inc., a Delice de 
France branch of the global bakery chain Arzyta 
(supplying the wider Dublin region with taste-
less and overpriced baguettes), and a high-
profile manufacturing establishment for bio-
pharmaceuticals. Following a presentation on 
the planning of the Grange Castle Park and its 
potential for generating a badly needed eco-
nomic upturn in the region, participants eagerly 
queued for copies of the high-gloss Grange 
Castle Masterplan and then boarded the tour 
bus now travelling to the University of Limerick’s 
Science Park.  
 
On our way there we passed a larger area with 
recently built housing, ranging from blocks of 
flats to terraced and detached houses, all with 
freshly asphalted highway connections for 
commuters to Dublin. To my own surprise as 
much as that of the Bahraini officials sitting next 
to me on the bus, the Irish EPZ consultant guid-
ing the tour via the internal microphone-
loudspeaker system explicitly drew our attention 
to these endless rows of new buildings. These, 
he said, were a warning sign for the pitfalls of 
badly planned and unregulated rapid economic 
developments. The Irish, he said, had been too 
greedy. Over decades, they had demanded 
ever-higher wages, forgetting how they came 
from the poorhouse of Europe. Different gov-
ernments had supported wage increases and 
thereby shattered the foundations of the Irish 
boom, which had been low wages attracting 
foreign investments in basic manufacturing, and 
which had offered large-scale employment. 
Once the downturn in manufacturing had be-
gun, the government had kept economic growth 
alive by subsidising mortgages, and now the 
Irish middle-class lived in negative equity – with 
mortgages on housing that was now valued far 
below the purchasing price, meaning that a 
household’s debts were higher than their securi-
ties in many cases. This mass-phenomenon of 
shattered hopes, however, was a wellspring of 
hope to the consultant. For now, the wages 
were coming crashing down. And his ultimate 
hope was that the current decline by forty per 
cent from the previous year would continue so 
that investors would come flocking in and a new 
generation of workers could fill EPZs across the 
Republic of Ireland, much like the one we had 
just visited in the Grange Castle Park. 
 
 
Conclusions: Hope as Paradox and Conflict 
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Obviously, the scope of the above elaborations 
is limited to sketching some analytical catego-
ries for an anthropological political economy 
approach to hope. First and foremost, the being 
of hope, as a universal of human being, turns 
out to match the qualities of classical anthropo-
logical trickster beings. For hope may carry hu-
mans from dawn (as in the quote, “It’s dawn”, 
invoked by Zigon, 2009) to dusk and keep them 
sane. However, there is no guarantee for an 
individual, a household, or a nation-state that 
anything has changed about a potentially mis-
erable trajectory in the global system when 
night falls on a day spent hoping. In fact, every-
thing may be worse at the next dawn than it 
was at dusk. Assuming that humans are capa-
ble of learning, in modes of unreflective and 
reflective being alike, tomorrow’s hope may 
differ substantially from today’s.  
 
Secondly, and taking the opening elaborations 
on hope’s political economy dimension one step 
further, it is now safe to say that while hope is a 
necessary component of social life it is not sole-
ly pointed towards the future. Instead, hope’s 
intersubjective qualities have much to do with 
the way humans assess past experiences and 
they may, in fact, pit one subject against anoth-
er – or against an institution.  
 
Thirdly, and for now finally, the existence of 
conflicting – possibly confrontational – hopes in 
any field of research is more than likely. For 
hopes are related to experiences and under-
standings of how to achieve prosperity and how 
to overcome inequality. Constellations created 
by the intricacies of ascent and decline in the 
global capitalist system, as were evident in the 
Irish crisis in summer 2010, may even drive 
apart the hopes of subjects and/or institutions 
with otherwise seemingly common causes. 
Hopes for national development and economic 
progress, for example, may rest on the impover-
ishment of larger segments of a given nation’s 
population, so that low wages for workers may 
again attract capital.  
 
The analytical dimensions for an anthropologi-
cal political economy of hope that I have devel-
oped above – trickster being/paradoxes, tempo-
rality, and confrontation – are central to the 
world historical and reflective potentialities and 
qualities of hope. Hope as a universal aspect of 
human being informs not only individuals but 
also larger associations – institutions of what-
ever epoch and scale, kinship groups as much 
as present-day nation-states or imperial for-
mations. No matter whether hope is an issue of 
anthropological research in the Global South or 
elsewhere, and no matter whether such re-
search comes at a time of crisis or at a time of 
prosperity, hopes are always reflections of 
times past and of the trajectories that humans 
and the associations they form envision as par-
ticularly pertinent for their being in the world. 
Therefore, one person’s hope may well be an-
other person’s worst nightmare – surely, hope is 
as much a reason for confrontation as for stay-
ing sane. What is more, hope per se may be as 
much an inspiration for stasis, even for reaction, 
as it may be an inspiration for progress.  
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DAMAGE CONTROL: HOW TO STOP THE 
MARKET FROM RUNNING AWAY WITH 
OUR LIVES 
by Bill Freund (Professor Emeritus (Economic 
History), University of KwaZulu-Natal, and Vi-
siting Professor at the School of Economics and 
Business Science, University of the Witwaters-
rand) 
 
There are today a growing list of deeply worry-
ing trends: a pseudo-war of civilisations à la 
Samuel Huntington largely engendered by 
Western interventions in Middle Eastern politics 
as the old nationalist dictatorships crumble, the 
uncertainties of climate change, and profound 
discontent with market values and the system of 
political and economic structures constructed 
using those values. Politics in most countries 
seems inconsequential: little changes between 
the oscillations of different parties which have 
their values and ideals hollowed out by the 
practical ‘facts’ from one election to the next.  
 
This contribution, however, primarily looks at 
the economic side of things, and in particular 
the damage done by the global crisis of 2008. 
The system is assaulted by capitalists trying to 
seize command of the new technologies and 
beat the odds to magnify profits through ques-
tionable speculation, and incurring debts some 
of which will have to be recovered if the capital-
ists in question are too ‘big to fail’. Some coun-
tries are stuck with depression-like conditions 
that appear impossible to rectify so as to return 
to a happier normality – the notion of which ap-
peals to people but is starting to fade in 
memory. The European Union depends on 
harmonising the interests of different economic 
structures; insistence on formulae that fail to 
acknowledge this are likely to fragilise the Union 
and lead to its eventual dissolution.  
 
This crisis was substantially mitigated in many 
countries by the continuing hyper-growth of the 
Chinese economy, hungry for all sorts of raw 
materials and technologies, but this stimulus is 
beginning to wear down, probably never to re-
turn. In 2015 global stagnation seems more the 
order of the day. Nor is there any conceivable 
growth curve that could substitute for the im-
mense scale of China as a trading partner and 
consumer. 
 
We are left at best with the slow growth that 
Piketty has convincingly shown is normal under 
peaceful capitalist historical sequences: modest 
profits and yet rapid technological change, 
which undermines many of the benefits taken 
for granted in the post-World War II West. The 
sovereign debts of the USA and Japan, ac-
ceptable under conditions of rapid growth, no 
longer seem so acceptable. Notably we are 
entering a phase where the demand for indus-
trial labour is stagnant or diminishing.  
 
A starting point to counter these trends without 
closing the door on technological progress 
would lie in establishing far tighter controls on 
banks. A large part of the banking sector should 
be nationalised, and in particular insulated from 
questionable forms of speculation. The stock 
markets require far more regulation and watch-
fulness to block over-exuberance. It will have to 
be conceded that banks are not ‘too big to fail’ – 
none of them – and that they will need to write 
off much of their debt, particularly when in-
curred in ways that were not really overseen by 
serious due diligence.  An important part of the 
regulatory system, too, is the need to get rid of 
tax havens and to use the fiscal system to re-
duce the extravagance and much-resented ac-
tivities of the wealthy.   
 
It is probably true that one could tackle inequali-
ty by enhancing insecurity and making inher-
itance and fiscal stability harder to come by. 
Inheritance, in the broad sense of cultural capi-
tal, looms larger where market forces reign su-
preme, despite the illusion of equal opportunity. 
This would intensify technological advances à la 
Schumpeter, no doubt, but at the cost of a world 
of instability and possible intensification of vio-
lence and war.  
 
I would rather see the state intervene to limit 
change in a political context that ensures that it 
will not be the few that benefit. Big firms should 
be obliged to take on services that they have 
shed – so-called ‘non-core operations’ – and 
unnecessary dismissals monitored and limited 
as much as possible. Mergers should be dis-
couraged, and the break-up of overly large firms 
encouraged. The state needs to invest more in 
the quality of  education (as opposed to promot-
ing research and job certification), and in con-
tinually improving the quality of social policy,  
and to adapt the health and social system to 
cope with the advances in medicine that allow 
so many people to experience long periods of 
old age. There needs to be a cultural and fiscal 
adaptation to a world where ‘limits to growth’, as 
outlined in the Brundtland report and other doc-
uments at the onset of the change in world eco-
nomic conditions, lead to different trajectories in 
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terms of creating a satisfying life for the popula-
tion. 
 
International economic relations should not be 
conducted on the basis of the reification of pure 
market forces to the advantage of the strong. 
The WTO needs to be reformed so as to en-
courage the industrialisation of countries which 
have capacity and a chance to develop their 
internal strengths. Their potential should not be 
swamped by imports from richer countries, ex-
aggerated so-called intellectual property rights, 
with the downside of free trade acknowledged. 
There ought to be international agency which 
can regulate but also offer advice as to how to 
use fossil fuels and how to develop energy sup-
plies that are less costly to the environment of 
the earth. In my country, South Africa, a combi-
nation of the continued structural dominance of 
mineral extraction and beneficiation, plus the 
firm dominance of oligopolies in most areas of 
the economy, plus the purchase of the strong-
est economic activities by global or foreign firms 
uninterested in the economic future of the coun-
try, together form a barrier against changing the 
historic ‘growth path’ and allowing the state to 
preside over changes that would diffuse skills 
and jobs, and enable progress in solving the 
two huge problems of massive unemployment 
and inequality. These problems are hard to ad-
dress under present conditions. 
 
In general, there is a need to balance the un-
derstandable desire to allow technologies to 
develop as part of the ongoing human project – 
a desire which must go together with a positive 
attitude to structural changes and the human 
ability to adapt – with an equivalent need to 
provide more stability, more of a safety net, 
more predictability in the lives of most people 
through nationalisation of key sectors of the 
economy, equitable management of social ser-
vices (hopefully by a democratic state), and 
regulation of economic activities in order to suit 
the changing times. This is a question of chang-
ing values as well as macro-economic forms. It 
is hard to say how much can change at the be-
hest of a shielded and powerful elite alone; The 
operation of key agencies for regulation and 
control certainly must be mitigated or dominated 
by political movements appropriate to particular 
national or regional settings, and the real prob-
lem now is the inappropriateness of most of our 
older political wisdom and the lack of a coherent 
approach as to how to organise and convince 
people of the need for politics that has this in 
mind. There really is no equivalent to the prole-
tariat of the Communist Manifesto today, espe-
cially in a world where the global ties become 
ever thicker and more complex. Can a ‘multi-
tude’ à la Negri serve as a substitute? 
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AFRICA’S REVOLUTIONARY CENTURY2 
by Keith Hart (Centennial Professor of Econom-
ic Anthropology, London School of Economics 
and International Director, the Human Economy 
programme, University of Pretoria.) 
 
Emancipation from a racist world? 
We live in a racist world. Despite the collapse of 
European empire and the formal adoption of a 
façade of international bureaucracy, the vast 
majority of black Africans are still waiting for 
meaningful emancipation from their perceived 
social inferiority. Until recently there was much 
talk of economic growth in Africa. In the present 
decade, 7 out of the 10 fastest-growing econo-
mies (as conventionally measured) have been 
African. But the current global economic slow-
down has already cast doubt on the durability of 
this growth. What is indisputable is that Africa’s 
population will multiply rapidly in the twenty-first 
century and, even without an economic miracle, 
all these extra people will have more to spend. 
In 1900 Africa was the least densely populated 
and urbanized continent, with 7.5% of the 
world’s total population. Today it accounts for 
double that, with an urban share fast approach-
ing the global average. According to UN projec-
tions, Africa will be home to 25% of all the peo-
ple alive in 2050; 40% in 2100 (when Asia will 
contribute 42% and the rest 18%). This is be-
cause Africa’s annual population growth rate is 
2.5% while the rest of the world is ageing and 
its share is in decline. The Asian manufacturing 
countries already recognize that Africa is the 
fastest-growing market in the world. This might 
provide an opportunity for Africans to play a 
stronger hand in international negotiations af-
fecting their interests. If they succeed in stand-
ing up for themselves, it would be a world revo-
lution – the end of the racist world order, no 
less. 
 
The movement to abolish slavery was officially 
completed in the late nineteenth century. But 
emancipation is rarely as simple as that. In 
West Africa, abolition was a disaster. The inter-
nal drive to capture slaves continued regardless 
and, despite a shift in their use to domestic pro-
duction, supply soon exceeded demand. The 
price of slaves fell drastically, leading to their 
widespread abuse. Colonial empires were then 
justified by the consequent disorder in West 
                                                
2 This argument has been made public in several forms 
and at various lengths. It is currently being developed as a 
book, Africa’s Coming Revolution. 
Africa and by the drive to abolish the Arab slave 
trade in East Africa. Much later, when colonial 
regimes fell, Africans were promised emancipa-
tion once more, this time through national inde-
pendence. Most African economies then re-
gressed for a half-century. Apartheid was de-
feated in South Africa, but two decades later the 
country is no less unequal and unemployment 
is rampant. Africans are still waiting for equal 
membership of world society. But they have 
never encountered more favourable conditions 
than in the century to come.  
In the twentieth century, a population explosion 
was accompanied by a jump in Africa’s urban 
share from under 2% of the population to al-
most half. This urban revolution is not just a 
proliferation of cities, but also entails installing 
the whole package of pre-industrial class socie-
ty: states, urban elites, intensification of agricul-
ture, and a political economy based on the city 
bazaar and extraction of rural surpluses. 
The anti-colonial revolution unleashed hopes for 
transformation of an unequal world. These have 
not yet been realized for most Africans. Africa’s 
new leaders thought they were building modern 
economies, but in reality they were erecting 
fragile states based on the same small-scale 
agriculture as before. Either machine production 
in some sectors would generate economic 
growth, or the state would devolve to a level 
compatible with its low productivity base. This 
structural weakness inevitably led most coun-
tries to exchange the democratic legitimacy of 
the independence struggle for the dependence 
of autocratic rulers on foreign powers. Life sup-
port to Africa’s new ruling elites was switched 
off in the early 1980s with the coming of the 
neoliberal order. Many governments were made 
bankrupt and some countries collapsed into civil 
war. 
The growth of cities should normally lead to 
rural-urban exchange, as farmers supply food to 
city-dwellers and in turn buy the latter’s manu-
factures and services. But this progressive divi-
sion of labour requires a measure of protection 
from the world market, and it was stifled at birth 
in post-colonial Africa by the dumping of subsi-
dized food from the tax-rich West, and later of 
cheap Asian manufactures. ‘Structural adjust-
ment programmes’ imposed by the World Bank 
and IMF meant that Africa’s fledgling national 
economies had no protection. Tax collection in 
Africa was never as regular as in Eurasia, and 
governments still rely on whatever they can 
extract from mineral royalties and the import-
	   Multilingualism in the Global South (and beyond) - Voices from around the world  
Global South Studies Center, University of Cologne, Germany - http://gssc.uni-­‐koeln.de/node/927 
export trade. Rents secured by political privilege 
are the chief source of wealth. This constitutes 
an Old Regime ripe for liberal revolution.  
African development in the 21st century 
Development refers first of all to humanity’s 
hectic dash from the countryside to the city 
since 1800. The engine driving this economic 
growth is usually assumed to be capitalism. 
Development then means trying to understand 
how capitalist growth is generated and how to 
make good the damage it causes in repeated 
cycles of creation and destruction. A third 
meaning refers to the developmental states of 
the mid-twentieth century, the idea that gov-
ernments are best placed to engineer sustained 
economic growth with redistribution. The most 
common usage, however, refers to the com-
mitment of rich countries after decolonization to 
helping poor countries become richer. This was 
at first real enough, even if the means chosen 
were often flawed. But after the 1970s, it has 
faded. If the rapid growth of the world economy 
in the decades after the Second World War 
encouraged a belief that poor countries could 
become rich, since the 1980s ‘development’ 
has meant securing the free global movement 
of capital and administering minor palliatives to 
the wounds inflicted. Development is the label 
for political relations between rich and poor 
countries after colonial empire.  
There are two pressing features of our world: 
the unprecedented expansion of markets since 
the Second World War, and massive economic 
inequality between (and within) nations. Becom-
ing closer and more unequal at the same time is 
a recipe for disaster. Africa, with one-seventh of 
the world’s population, had 2% of global pur-
chasing power around the Millennium. What 
could Africa’s new urban populations produce 
for the world economy? Apart from exporting 
raw materials, when they could, the world mar-
ket for food and other agricultural products is 
skewed by Western farm subsidies. Manufac-
tures face intense competition from Asia. Afri-
can countries should argue collectively in the 
councils of world trade for protection from inter-
national dumping, so that their farmers and in-
fant industries might supply their own popula-
tions first, and endogenous development would 
have a chance. 
Exchange between cities and their hinterlands 
has been frustrated for post-colonial Africa, 
whose bargaining position is undermined by its 
being fragmented into 54 states. The fastest-
growing sector of world trade is the production 
of culture: entertainment, education, media, 
sports, software, and information services. The 
terrain is less rigidly fixed here than in agricul-
ture and manufactures, and Africans start with 
the advantage of a proven global preference for 
their music, films, and plastic arts. 
Classes for and against a liberal revolution 
The classical liberal revolutions were sustained 
by three ideas: that freedom and economic pro-
gress require increased movement of people, 
goods and money in the market; that the politi-
cal framework most compatible with this is de-
mocracy; and that social progress depends on 
science, the drive to know how things really 
work. The energies generated by Africa’s urban 
revolution are already manifested in economy, 
technology, religion and the arts; and they could 
be harnessed to radical change if freed from the 
Old Regime of presidential kleptocracy. 
Rousseau’s condemnation of eighteenth-
century France rings just as true for our world: 
‘It is manifestly contrary to the law of nature, 
however defined… that a handful of people 
should gorge themselves with superfluities 
while the hungry multitude goes in want of ne-
cessities’. The institutions of agrarian civilization 
are alive and well – and not just in post-colonial 
Africa. Rent-seeking is on the rise in the old 
capitalist countries too. The greatest riches are 
no longer acquired through the selling of prod-
ucts cheaper than those of one’s competitors; 
rents secured by political privilege – such as Big 
Pharma’s income from patents, monopoly reve-
nues from DVDs, and tax revenues used to bail 
out the Wall Street banks – sustain the super-
rich today in a world where the top 65 billion-
aires own as much as half the people alive. 
In The Wretched of the Earth, Frantz Fanon 
provides a blueprint for a class analysis of dec-
adent societies ripe for revolution. Political par-
ties and unions were weak and conservative in 
late colonial Africa, representing only a tiny part 
of the population: the industrial workers, civil 
servants, intellectuals, and shopkeepers of the 
towns, classes unwilling to jeopardize their own 
privileges. They were hostile to and suspicious 
of the mass of country people. The latter had 
customary chiefs supervised by the military and 
administrative officials of the occupying power. 
A nationalist middle class of professionals and 
traders confronted the superstition and feudal-
ism of traditional authorities. Landless peasants 
joined the urban rabble. Eventually colonial re-
pression forced the nationalists to flee the 
towns and to take refuge with the peasantry. 
Only then, with the rural-urban divide temporari-
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ly healed by crisis, did a mass movement take 
off. Fanon’s method offers guidance as to how 
to identify the potential for another African revo-
lution. 
Clearly, trade and finance are not organized, in 
Africa or the world at large, with a view to gen-
erating a popular movement. A liberal revolution 
would need allies with significant wealth and 
power. Africans will have to develop their own 
transnational associations to combat the huge 
coalitions that would deny them self-expression. 
One of the strongest political movements today 
is the formation of large regional trading blocs in 
response to neoliberal globalization. A national 
framework for development never made sense 
in Africa and it makes even less sense today. 
The coming revolution could leapfrog many of 
the obstacles in its path, but not if African socie-
ties still wear the national straitjacket they inher-
ited from colonial rule.  
Freedom and protection in the early modern 
revolutions 
The American, French, and Italian revolutions 
all combined mass insurgency with an extended 
period of warfare focused on removing frag-
mented sovereignty, unfair taxes, and re-
strictions placed on movement and trade; Ger-
man unification had a similar focus, but is less 
straightforwardly described as ‘liberal’. The suc-
cess of the British in establishing a global free 
trade regime in the nineteenth century and the 
revival of free trade as economic orthodoxy 
today have obscured the complex dialectic of 
freedom and protection whose imperatives were 
laid out by Sir James Steuart in Principles of 
Political Economy (1767). The first imperative 
was for impediments to trade caused by divided 
sovereignty within and between states to be 
overcome. Development under these circum-
stances depended on removing these barriers 
to trade. At the same time, these incipient free 
trade areas needed a measure of protection, so 
that their own agriculture and manufactures 
could benefit from supplying newly consolidated 
home markets. The French revolution is a strik-
ing case in point. 
In 1793, the Terror was unleashed and the 
Bretons raised a ‘Royal and Catholic Army’ 
against which the revolutionary Republic raised 
an army to fight in what became known as the 
War of Vendée. Nantes, France’s largest port, 
was heavily involved in slavery and trade with 
the Caribbean. It stood out for the Republic and 
was besieged by the Royalist army as a result. 
The ensuing battle was decisive for the Revolu-
tion; the shippers financed the Republican ar-
my. Why did the Nantes bourgeoisie risk so 
much for the Revolution? France, although a 
central monarchy, was then a patchwork of lo-
cal fief-holders, each of whom exacted what 
they could from people and goods moving 
through their territory. The Republic promised to 
end all that and establish a regulated home 
market. The Nantes shippers wanted to reduce 
the costs of moving their trade goods inland and 
so they allied themselves with the Republic. 
Needless to say, the revolutionaries lacked the 
means to fund an army. 
In the United States, American and Dutch 
smugglers led resistance to the East India 
Company’s tea monopoly and to British taxes 
offsetting the crown’s military costs. The Italian 
Risorgimento too was backed financially by the 
industrialists of Milan and Turin, who wanted a 
less fragmented home market with unrestricted 
access to world trade. In all three cases, the 
power of merchant and manufacturing capital 
played a decisive part in the revolution.  
Long before the European Common Market 
became the European Union, the Prussian Zoll-
verein (customs union) was launched in 1818 
and culminated in the German empire in 1871. 
In each case political unification was preceded 
by a customs union lasting half a century. The 
Zollverein was a piecemeal attempt to harmo-
nise tariffs, measures, and economic policy in 
scattered territories controlled by the Prussian 
ruling family. The Germans felt vulnerable to 
British and French power because of their own 
extreme political fragmentation (some 40 states 
in 1815, more later). Prussia’s main aim was to 
develop a protected zone of internal free trade 
from which the Austrians were excluded. By the 
1860s, most of what soon became Germany 
had joined the customs union. Their leading 
economist, Friedrich List, proposed a ‘national 
system’ of political economy. He emphasized 
the scope for innovation within an expanded 
free trade area protected from the world market. 
Similar proposals were espoused by Americans 
like Alexander Hamilton and Henry Clay. 
Towards greater integration of African trade  
President Mbeki’s idea of an ‘African renais-
sance’ expressed the belief that a black majority 
government in South Africa might be a catalyst 
for an African economic revival based on great-
er political coordination between what had so 
far been easy pickings for the world’s great 
powers. His initiative was aimed exclusively at 
the very political class that had failed Africa so 
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often since independence. He did not factor civil 
society movements or mass mobilisation into 
his plans.  
Africa currently consists of a labyrinthine confu-
sion of regional associations which do little to 
strengthen their members’ bargaining power in 
world markets. On the ground, however, African 
peoples maintain patterns of long-distance 
movement and exchange developed over cen-
turies, despite their current rulers’ attempts to 
force economy and society into national cages. 
This is one reason why so much of the African 
economy is held to be ‘informal’: state regula-
tions are routinely ignored by most people, so 
that half of the population and most economic 
activities are criminalized and an absurd public 
effort is wasted on trying to apply unenforceable 
rules. Classical liberalism offers an answer to 
this chaos – aiming for the widest area possible 
for free trade and movement with minimal regu-
lation by the authorities.  Neoliberal globaliza-
tion has done much to discredit this recipe, 
since political initiatives, even in pursuit of local 
free trade, are anathema. Yet the policy conclu-
sion is inescapable: the boundaries of free 
commerce and of state intervention should be 
pushed beyond the limits of existing sovereign-
ties. 
China occupied a similar slot to Africa in West-
ern consciousness not long ago. In the 1930s, 
people often spoke of the Chinese as they do of 
Africa today. China was then crippled by the 
violence of warlords, its peasants mired in the 
worst poverty imaginable. Today the country is 
an economic superpower. This profound shift in 
power from West to East does not guarantee 
that Africa will escape soon from the stigma of 
inferiority, but the structures of North Atlantic 
dominance that once seemed inevitable are 
perceptibly in decline; and that makes it easier 
to envisage change. Humanity is entering a new 
era of social possibility. Africans’ drive for 
emancipation from an unequal world society 
affects all of us. In that sense an African revolu-
tion would be a world revolution.  
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FORGET “DEVELOPING” POOR COUN-
TRIES. IT’S TIME TO “DE-DEVELOP” 
RICH COUNTRIES. 
by Jason Hickel (London School of Economics) 
 
Last year, heads of state gathered in New York 
to sign the UN’s new sustainable development 
goals (SDGs). The main objective of the SDGs 
is to eradicate poverty by 2030. Beyoncé, One 
Direction, Malala and many other celebrities 
were contracted for the publicity campaign, 
which was billed as the largest in the world.  
When the SDGs were launched, it was staged 
as a monumental international celebration. 
Given all the fanfare, one might think the SDGs 
must offer a fresh plan for how to save the 
world, but beneath all the hype, it’s business as 
usual. The main strategy for eradicating poverty 
is the same as it has always been: GDP 
growth.  
 
Growth has been the main object of develop-
ment for the past 70 years, despite the fact 
that it’s not working. Since 1980, the global 
economy has grown by 380%, but the number 
of people living in poverty on less than $5 
(£3.20) a day has increased by more than 1.1 
billion. That’s 17 times the population of Britain. 
So much for the trickle-down effect. 
 
Orthodox economists insist that all we need is 
yet more growth. More progressive types tell 
us that we need to shift some of the yields of 
growth from the richer segments of the popula-
tion to the poorer ones, evening things out a bit. 
Neither approach is adequate. Why? Because 
even at current levels of average global con-
sumption, we’re overshooting our planet’s bio-
capacity by more than 50% each year. 
 
In other words, growth isn’t an option any more 
– we’ve already grown too much. Scientists are 
now telling us that we’re blowing past planetary 
boundaries at breakneck speed. And the hard 
truth is that this global crisis is due almost en-
tirely to overconsumption in rich countries. 
 
Right now, our planet only has enough re-
sources for each of us to consume 1.8 “global 
hectares” annually – a standardised unit that 
measures resource use and waste. This figure 
is roughly what the average person in Ghana or 
Guatemala consumes. By contrast, people in 
the US and Canada consume about 8 hectares 
per person, while Europeans consume 4.7 hec-
tares – many times their fair share. 
 
What does this mean for our theory of devel-
opment? Economist Peter Edward argues that 
instead of pushing poorer countries to “catch 
up” with rich ones, we should be thinking of 
ways to get rich countries to “catch down” to 
more appropriate levels of development. We 
should look at societies where people live long 
and happy lives at relatively low levels of in-
come and consumption not as basket cases 
that need to be developed towards Western 
models, but as exemplars of efficient living. 
 
How much do we really need in order to live 
long and happy lives? In the US, life expectancy 
is 79 years and GDP per capita is $53,000. But 
many countries have achieved similar life ex-
pectancy with a mere fraction of this income. 
Cuba has a comparable life expectancy to the 
US and one of the highest literacy rates in the 
world with GDP per capita of only $6,000 and 
consumption of only 1.9 hectares – right at the 
threshold of ecological sustainability. Similar 
claims can be made of Peru, Ecuador, Hondu-
ras, Nicaragua, and Tunisia. 
 
Yes, some of the excess income and consump-
tion we see in the rich world yields improve-
ments in quality of life that are not captured by 
life expectancy, or even literacy rates. But even 
if we look at measures of overall happiness and 
well-being in addition to life expectancy, a num-
ber of low- and middle-income countries rank 
highly. Costa Rica manages to sustain one of 
the highest happiness indicators and life expec-
tancies in the world with a per capita income 
one-fourth that of the US. 
 
In light of this, perhaps we should regard such 
countries not as underdeveloped, but rather as 
appropriately developed. And maybe we need 
to start calling on rich countries to justify their 
excesses. 
 
The idea of “de-developing” rich countries might 
prove to be a strong rallying cry in the Global 
South, but it will be tricky to sell to Westerners. 
Tricky, but not impossible. According to recent 
consumer research, 70% of people in middle- 
and high-income countries believe overcon-
sumption is putting our planet and society at 
risk. A similar majority also believe we should 
strive to buy and own less, and that doing so 
would not compromise our happiness. People 
sense there is something wrong with the domi-
nant model of economic progress and they are 
hungry for an alternative narrative. 
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The problem is that the pundits promoting this 
kind of transition are using the wrong language. 
They use terms such as de-growth, zero 
growth or – worst of all – de-development, 
which are technically accurate but off-putting for 
anyone who’s not already on board. Such terms 
are repulsive because they run against the 
deepest frames we use to think about human 
progress, and, indeed, the purpose of life itself. 
It’s like asking people to stop moving positively 
thorough life, to stop learning, improving, grow-
ing. 
 
Negative formulations won’t get us anywhere. 
The idea of “steady-state” economics is a step 
in the right direction and is growing in populari-
ty, but it still doesn’t get the framing right. We 
need to reorient ourselves toward a positive 
future, a truer form of progress. One that is 
geared toward quality instead of quantity. One 
that is more sophisticated than just accumulat-
ing ever-increasing amounts of stuff, 
which doesn’t make anyone happier anyway. 
What is certain is that GDP as a measure is not 
going to get us there and we need to get rid of 
it. 
 
Perhaps we might take a cue from Latin Ameri-
cans, who are organising alternative visions 
around the indigenous concept of buen vivir, or 
good living. The West has its own tradition of 
reflection on the good life, and it’s time we re-
vived it. Robert and Edward Skidelsky take us 
down this road in their book How Much is 
Enough?, where they lay out the possibility of 
interventions such as banning advertising, a 
shorter working week, and a basic income, all of 
which would improve our lives while reducing 
consumption. 
 
Either we slow down voluntarily, or climate 
change will do it for us. We can’t go on ignoring 
the laws of nature. But rethinking our theory of 
progress is not only an ecological imperative, it 
is also a development one. If we do not act 
soon, all our hard-won gains against poverty will 
evaporate, as food systems collapse and mass 
famine re-emerges to an extent not seen since 
the 19th century. 
 
This is not about giving anything up – at least 
not anything that’s actually important. And it’s 
certainly not about living a life of voluntary mis-
ery or imposing harsh limits on human potential. 
On the contrary, it’s about reaching a higher 
level of understanding and consciousness 
about what we’re doing here and why.  
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THE REPUBLIC OF WELBEING: A 
MANIFESTO FOR TRANSFORMATION 
TO ACHIEVE THE SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT GOALS 
by Lorenzo Fioramonti (Professor of Political 
Economy at the University of Pretoria) 
 
For too long, the international community has 
embraced a destructive development model 
and rewarded behaviour that has led to social 
and ecological imbalances. For most of the 20th 
century, success was defined as purely material 
economic growth, a narrow conceptualization of 
development that had a tremendous effect on 
international institutions, on the design of mar-
kets (at the local, national, and global levels), 
and on the global pecking order. The largest 
economies in the world were rewarded with 
prestige and power, regardless of whether their 
actions were destructive of their own societies 
and of the world at large. The environmental 
crisis (especially climate change) and the global 
economic downturn have contributed to a shift-
ing of focus from economic growth to well-being 
as the overarching goal of both public and pri-
vate institutions. More and more governments 
have begun to actively pursue well-being-
oriented initiatives, while international institu-
tions, chiefly the United Nations, have called for 
change. In the words of Secretary General Ban 
Ki Moon, “the old model is broken”: “We need a 
new economic paradigm that recognizes the 
parity between the three pillars of sustainable 
development. Social, economic and environ-
mental well-being are indivisible.”  
 
Against this backdrop, the Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals (SDGs) are a window of oppor-
tunity for radical change. This is not to say that 
they are perfect. Much to the contrary, they suf-
fer from contradictions and redundancies, and 
ultimately reveal the inevitable compromises of 
most international agreements. Yet they capture 
crucial aspects of social, political, economic, 
and environmental sustainability that will guide 
the action of governments in the years to come.  
In this regard, they present progressive policy-
makers, activists, and concerned citizens with 
an opportunity to transform their economies 
from mere producers of growth to promoters of 
human and ecological well-being. Although pre-
sented as a list, it is clear that the various SDGs 
are highly interconnected and reinforce each 
other. It is indeed impossible to end poverty “in 
all its forms” (goal 1) without addressing gender 
inequalities (goal 5) and promoting inclusive 
education (goal 4). Nor is it possible to achieve 
sustainable and equitable economic develop-
ment (goals 8 and 15), without reducing ine-
qualities (goal 10), preserving oceans (goal 14) 
and terrestrial ecosystems (goal 15), and with-
out tackling climate change (goal 13).   
For the SDGs to be more than a wish list, the 
interconnectedness of all dimensions must lead 
to a shift in governance processes, starting with 
the need to design institutions that are effective, 
accountable, and inclusive (goal 16). If the pro-
motion of human and ecological wellbeing is to 
become the founding principle of political and 
economic activities going forward, what implica-
tions will this have for our public and private 
institutions?  
 
Let’s imagine a nation that is genuinely commit-
ted to pursuing the SDGs as its overarching 
policy framework. Let’s call it the Republic of 
Wellbeing. This country will require a shift from 
short-term to long-term planning. Presently, our 
governments and private sectors are overly 
concerned with short-term economic dynamics 
(a phenomenon known as “quarterly capital-
ism”, criticized also by US presidential candi-
date Hillary Clinton). We base critical decisions 
on sketchy estimates of gross domestic prod-
uct, inflation, and stock prices, to name just a 
few examples, whose quarterly changes are 
very misleading, not only because of statistical 
errors but also because of their inherent flaws 
as indicators of good performance and success. 
By contrast, the SDGs place more emphasis on 
processes that require time to change. 
What the Republic of Wellbeing will need is a 
new system of policy-planning and information-
sharing, which encourages all stakeholders (not 
only public institutions) to work together to 
achieve a long-term view. The following are 
building blocks of such a transformation. 
 
First, the Republic of Wellbeing should incorpo-
rate the concept of sustainability into its own 
founding constitution, something that Latin 
American and Caribbean countries have pro-
moted through the Quito Declaration, following 
the successful examples of Ecuador and Boliv-
ia.  New Zealand has also attributed personal 
rights to the Whanganui River, and legal ave-
nues have been sought by citizens to defend 
nature as a common good, with recent suc-
cesses in the US and in the Netherlands (see 
also the campaign “Claim the Sky” ). This would 
require legislators to assess how decisions af-
fect not only the present but also future genera-
tions, as well as ecosystems. 
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Second, the Republic of Wellbeing would need 
a new approach to policy-making, with a view to 
managing the interconnectedness of equitable 
and sustainable well-being. We have become 
used to the separation of offices, portfolios, and 
tasks, especially in the functioning of govern-
ment, according to the bureaucratic model of 
the late 1800s and in line with the prevailing 
philosophy of new public management. Alt-
hough this may have made decision-making 
more efficient in terms of sectoral outputs, it has 
also reduced the capacity of institutions to ap-
proach problems holistically. For instance, a 
reduction in spending by some depart-
ments/offices (e.g. infrastructure, water and 
sanitation, police, etc.), which is usually re-
warded as a sign of efficiency and good gov-
ernance, may easily result in additional burdens 
and extra costs for other departments (e.g. 
health or social affairs). Separation also en-
courages competition (for a limited budget), 
thus forgetting that cooperative approaches are 
vital to deal with the multifaceted and complex 
issues of contemporary governance. Therefore, 
in order to achieve the SDGs, the Republic of 
Wellbeing would need to adopt a ‘whole-of-
government’ approach, which the OECD de-
fines as a system of horizontal co-ordination 
and integration embedded in the process of 
policy design and implementation, which helps 
a government respond to complexity. The es-
tablishment of a ministry dedicated to the ‘fu-
ture’, as instituted in Sweden, shows that it is 
not impossible for a government to focus on the 
long-term implications of their decisions. 
 
Third, different metrics of performance are 
needed for the Republic of Wellbeing to prosper 
in its commitment to long-term quality develop-
ment. Current statistics are of little help, given 
that they reinforce short-termism and separation 
between “the economy” and the rest of society. 
Metrics of genuine progress, which deduct the 
costs of negative externalities from measures of 
national income such as the GDP, would be 
very useful policy tools, as has already been the 
case in the US states of Maryland and Vermont. 
In line with the focus on long-term governance, 
impact assessments, and cost-benefit analyses 
will need to adopt discount rates that are either 
neutral or give more weight to impacts and 
costs in the future than in the present, especial-
ly for natural and social capital. Reporting sys-
tems for business would also need to change. 
Total-cost accounting (including full environ-
mental and social costs) is essential to gauge 
which businesses are really adding to the econ-
omy and which are accumulating income at the 
expense of society, with a view to creating an 
appropriate system of rewards and sanctions. 
Sportswear giant Puma has pioneered envi-
ronmental profit and losses labeling for its prod-
ucts, and many companies have signed up for 
natural capital reporting. 
 
Fourth, the Republic of Wellbeing would need to 
institutionalize SDG-based impact evaluations. 
In the legislative domain, innovative forms of 
“regulatory impact assessment”, a practice in-
creasingly in vogue in the European Union, 
should be implemented, with public institutions 
required to engage with citizens about the ex-
pected effects of new legislations on sustaina-
ble development objectives. Ideally, even politi-
cal parties’ programmes should be vetted 
through public scrutiny with regard to their im-
pact on the SDGs, similar to what already hap-
pens in the Netherlands with respect to eco-
nomic policy targets. 
 
Last, but not least, the Republic of Wellbeing 
should be very vocal in global fora to ensure 
that international norms, principles, and agree-
ments are conducive to human and ecosystem 
wellbeing. A policy focus inspired by the SDGs 
will indeed demand a restructuring of the global 
economy, with a focus on reducing ecological 
footprints and incentivizing the transfer of inno-
vative technologies. In particular, financial mar-
kets and international trade will need to be re-
designed to support rather than impede sus-
tainable social progress, as a recent UN inquiry 
demonstrates. If global governance in the 20th 
century was led by nations and companies 
championing the classical model of industriali-
zation, with high social and environmental 
costs, the 21st-century system must be driven 
by those able to marry economic dynamism 
with a high quality of life and the promotion of 
human and ecosystem well-being. 
 
The Republic of Wellbeing is a metaphor of 
policy changes that are not utopian, but rather 
pragmatic and within reach, especially if we 
consider that each of these features is already 
present in one country or another, and that they 
are variously endorsed by an increasing num-
ber of companies as well. We need to build on 
the best governance innovations practiced by 
public institutions and private organizations if 
we are serious about using the SDGs as lever-
age to build a sustainable and desirable path to 
the future.  
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HOPE, PLURALISM AND POST-CRASH 
ECONOMICS 
 
by Paul Robert Gilbert (University of Sussex) 
 
The effects of the 2007–08 financial crisis con-
tinue to be deeply felt, in the United Kingdom as 
elsewhere. After being asked to shoulder un-
sustainable levels of private debt, the state has 
pursued austerity programmes designed to give 
‘confidence’ to holders of public debt. The re-
sultant disassembly of state welfare provision 
has had the effect of pushing low-income 
households into ever more debt, edging the UK 
closer to the conditions which precipitated the 
last crisis. Dozens of academic economists 
have publicly criticised the government’s plans 
to run a surplus in ‘normal’ times, plans which 
would tip households into further debt, as hav-
ing ‘no basis in economics’. Perhaps the endur-
ance of the profoundly flawed notion that gov-
ernments, like households, must ‘tighten their 
belts’ in lean times has less to do with academic 
economics, and more to do with economics as 
presented by media outlets, or with the tenden-
cy for news programmes to call economists 
working for private financial institutions as their 
talking heads? Perhaps, but the academics who 
have criticised ongoing austerity programmes 
for being based on ‘bad economics’ (or no eco-
nomics at all) are, for the most part, not to be 
found occupying positions in those very few 
institutions which exert an overwhelming influ-
ence on hiring and publishing in what seems to 
be a uniquely insular, hierarchical and concen-
trated discipline. 
 
It was the apparent failure of these mainstream 
academic economists not only to ‘predict’ the 
financial crisis, but also to draw on theoretical 
perspectives which could account for the crisis 
or explain it to their students afterwards – com-
bined with justifiable concerns about the extent 
to which influential economists were making 
money from consultancy work in financial ser-
vices – that precipitated global calls for reform 
in economics education. The International Stu-
dent Initiative for Pluralism in Economics draws 
student groups from over thirty countries to-
gether in a commitment to work against the 
narrowing of curricula that took place in the lead 
up to the crisis, and towards a truly pluralist 
pedagogy in economics that would ‘ultimately 
create a space in which solutions to society’s 
problems can be generated’. In the UK, the 
ISIPE-affiliated group Rethinking Economics 
has been working with a sympathetic academ-
ics on the development of a pluralist economics 
degree programme, which will be launched at 
Goldsmiths College next year – an advance on 
the CORE programme launched last year, 
which while introducing ‘new’ topics such as 
‘inequality’, and emphasising ‘real-world’ data, 
was not designed with pluralism in mind. An-
other UK-based ISIPE affiliate, the Post–Crash 
Economics Society, has been developing a 
‘Crash–Course in Citizen Economics’ through 
which to expand not only participation in tech-
nical economic discussions, but also participa-
tion in the administration of democracy through 
the economy. 
 
‘What is taught shapes the minds of the next 
generation of policymakers, and therefore 
shapes the societies we live in,’ affirm the sig-
natories to ISIPE’s international student call for 
pluralism in economics. Certainly, the relation 
between dominant schools of economic thought 
and specific policy decisions is never entirely 
linear, and cannot be completely captured in the 
broad-brush assertion that modern economics 
constitutes ‘an ideological prop for capitalism in 
general and neoliberalism in particular.’ But, as 
Peter–Wim Zuidhof observes, in the last few 
decades there has been a shift from subject-
matter-based to ‘principles-based’ economics 
textbooks, marked most clearly by Gregory 
Mankiw’s bestselling Principles of Economics, 
which presents adopting principles like ‘markets 
are usually a good way to organize economic 
activities’ as part of what it means to ‘think like 
an economist’. This is not without significance, 
Zuidhof argues, since ‘the principles genre with 
its call to think like an economist is also inclined 
to transform economics into a counsel of ne-
oliberal government. Where in the liberal mode, 
economics’ main role is to critique the efficacy 
of government policy, the principles text instead 
invites government to think like economists too’. 
If neoliberalism is understood not as the valori-
sation of ‘free’ markets, but as the re–
organisation of social life according to a crude 
kind of market rationality, then pluralising the 
parameters of what it means for future policy-
makers to ‘think like an economist’, beyond or-
ganising social life around ‘market principles’, 
does indeed appear to be a hopeful move. 
 
There are, nonetheless, reasons for tempering 
one’s enthusiasm for movements which seek to 
‘make space’ for plural perspectives. Max Haiv-
en and Alex Khasnabish have written at length 
about the extent to which movements built on 
‘making space’ imply that existing organisations 
are properly grounded to begin with, and need 
simply to ‘open up’ or be ‘more accepting’ of 
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difference. They advocate instead the ground-
ing of movements in practices of ‘making time’ 
for anti–oppression, a project that is inevitably 
endless. Without wishing to dismiss Haiven and 
Khasnabish’s acute insights, it is perhaps fair to 
argue that despite using the language of ‘mak-
ing space’, few in the movement for economic 
pluralism would be likely to defend the notion 
that existing economic (or academic) organisa-
tions are properly grounded; there is a wide-
spread appreciation of the extent to which plu-
ralism in economics education may invite di-
verse approaches to economic (re)organisation.   
Equally, one might share Stevphen Shukaitis’ 
wariness of ‘alternative’ economic formulations 
which develop models of utopian social reali-
ties, only to ‘get involved in conflicts over theo-
retical systems and interactions that may or 
may not occur when the new vision hits the 
pavement of actual existence’. The movement 
for pluralism in economics cannot, then, be a 
substitute for the work that is carried out by, for 
instance, the Community Economies Collective, 
who make visible and amplify already existing 
‘diverse’ economies, to which ethical negotia-
tions over the limits of necessity, consumption, 
surplus, and the commons are fundamental. 
Nonetheless, as long as life-chances are at 
least partially determined by the administration 
of a national economy, pluralist education for 
future policymakers, and initiatives like the 
Crash–Course, become a necessary part of 
realising democratic participation. 
 
In conversation with Mary Zournazi just over a 
decade ago, about the need for hope in the face 
of ‘neo-liberal – or economic rationalist – forms 
of capitalism that operate today’, Ernesto 
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe described the 
emergence of a collective will, or the ‘relation of 
equivalence’ between diverse demands 
(whether for water provision, employment, or 
perhaps today, debt relief) as a ‘moment of 
hope’; an empty signifier which cannot be ful-
filled, but which brings together and sustains 
other relations in a social movement. ‘What we 
are arguing,’ continued Mouffe, ‘is that to con-
ceive of a pluralist democracy as something 
that can be absolutely fulfilled indicates the end 
of pluralism… If you value pluralism, then you 
will have to be alive to the idea that the impos-
sibility of democracy [where everyone agrees] 
or some final goal is not an impediment, or 
something negative’. In the same vein, the 
movement for pluralism in economics can be 
viewed as a ‘moment of hope’ that sustains and 
brings together a diversity of demands for social 
change in a context shaped by policymakers 
who have been taught that ‘thinking like an 
economist’ means not only a commitment to 
market principles, but a rejection of doubt and 
indeterminacy. That this moment of hope is 
animated by a student-led dissatisfaction with 
economics curricula is not incidental. Indeed, as 
Paulo Freire argued, hope – a critical hope – is 
precisely what makes us educable.  
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RECLAIMING THE STATE 
By Tijo Salverda (Global South Studies Center, 
University of Cologne) 
 
From talks with (foreign) corporations and in-
vestors active in agriculture in Africa, particular-
ly in Zambia in my case, I realised that many of 
them are concerned about the issues critics 
have raised. These critics, ranging from (inter-
national) NGOs to local communities, human 
rights lawyers, international organisations, jour-
nalists, and social movements, increasingly 
point to the negative consequences of current 
forms of global capitalism. They try, in a way, to 
put ethics back into economics. They demand a 
halt to ‘land grabbing’, better treatment and 
wages for labourers, the mitigation of environ-
mental damage, and so forth. Resonating with 
the thoughts of John Kenneth Galbraith and 
Karl Polanyi, the critics can be considered a 
countervailing power or countermovement 
aimed at reducing the damaging effects of agri-
cultural investments – and corporate practices 
and market expansion more generally.  
 
The countervailing power of critics, such as 
NGOs, has been at the origin of phenomena 
such as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), 
impact investment, and ethical consumption. 
Notwithstanding the many limitations of these 
phenomena, they symbolise a more or less 
constant struggle between economic beliefs 
and ethical and social concerns. I have actually 
come to believe that this is a recurring pattern 
of capitalism. The raising of concerns, I have 
noticed, is not without its results. Change is 
possible. Large-scale systemic slavery has 
been abolished. In many Western countries 
labour conditions have seen improvements. 
Minimum wages have been implemented. 
There are laws that allow for the prosecution of 
companies in case of pollution. Yet it is never 
enough, never completed. There is always 
something to hope for. Besides, when one issue 
is solved or attention wanes, a new issue pre-
sents itself – or labour rights are gradually un-
dermined again. It is, in a way, a perpetual tam-
ing of the ‘capitalist beast’.  
 
Prominence of corporate power 
Notwithstanding that corporations are con-
cerned about their critics and have, in response, 
also changed some of their practices, there is 
still much left to be desired. This partly results 
from the shifting of roles between the public and 
private sectors, which has strengthened the 
power of multinational companies in interna-
tional politics. Conversely, the position of ordi-
nary citizens (as employees, consumers, local 
communities, etc.) has weakened in the context 
of state withdrawal. As Jem Bendell (2004: 14) 
illustrates in his analysis of the accountability 
movement, civil society groups and NGOs real-
ised that it was increasingly futile to lobby gov-
ernments, and that intergovernmental commit-
ments on social and environmental issues could 
take years to negotiate – and even then they 
were often not enforced in any meaningful 
sense. Instead, many civil society groups di-
rected their attention to the corporations them-
selves. This (social) pressure plays an im-
portant role in prompting corporations to em-
brace certain codes of conduct, mitigating their 
environmental impact, CSR, and other forms of 
integration of ethical concerns into existing eco-
nomic practices. One could therefore say that 
critics may ‘force’ economic actors to reflect on 
concerns that the latter often conceive of as 
external to standard business operations.  
 
There is plenty of very valid criticism about the 
limits of corporate actors’ engagement with the 
concerns that have been raised. CSR, for ex-
ample, has not really led to change, and seems 
more like a ‘moral fig leaf’ for corporations, 
while the same damaging practices often con-
tinue. For some, this is just confirmation of the 
inherently evil nature of corporations. I am not 
sure, though I would certainly not deny the pos-
sibility that they can cause substantial havoc. If 
they only acted immorally, however, it would 
imply that when left unattended they would not 
care whatsoever about the harm they cause. 
Certainly, corporations are interested in making 
a profit, but not necessarily at all costs: the ho-
mo economicus version of the corporate person 
who only acts to maximise profits, an image 
often reproduced by the critics, does not neces-
sarily reflect everyday realities, as Marina 
Welker illustrates in Enacting the Corporation: 
An American Mining Firm in Post-Authoritarian 
Indonesia.  
 
At the same time, there remain just too many 
examples of corporations – or banks, or other 
economic enterprises – that breach our hope for 
fairer and less damaging outcomes. Even while 
most economic actors may remain within the 
legal (and ethical) boundaries of the respective 
counties in which they operate, it is the ones 
that breach those boundaries that attract atten-
tion. The damaging influence of oil companies, 
such as Shell in Nigeria, or of mobile phone 
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producers in China, obscures the fact that the 
bakery or factory around the corner may do little 
harm. Compared to the latter, however, large 
multinational corporations and companies that 
operate and/or trade across borders seem to 
have much more room (and power) to tweak the 
system. It is certainly an achievement that large 
corporations such as Coca-Cola and Nestlé 
have become more receptive to the concerns 
raised. Yet, it appears that this is not enough. 
Not only because below the surface more 
anonymous actors, such as traders, are largely 
left unchallenged, but also because of the pos-
sibility of avoiding legal oversight. The possibil-
ity of shopping between the legal systems of 
different countries, having the power to negoti-
ate favourable (tax) deals, and getting away 
with breaking the law are still far from being 
eliminated. To change this, I argue, we have to 
reclaim the state.  
 
Towards a rebalancing of interests  
A main cause of the current predicament is that 
pressure on the private sector will never be suf-
ficient, while the state does not do what it 
should do – taking care of its citizens. Corpora-
tions’ first incentive is to make a profit; not nec-
essarily at all costs, but their mandate is not to 
take care of all (stakeholders) in a specific geo-
graphical space; rather ‘their contributions to 
society’s overall needs will always remain at the 
margins, and their contribution to welfare will 
never be comprehensive’ (Hertz 2001: 243). 
Thus private governance will not be able to ad-
dress the global governance deficit (Mayer and 
Gereffi 2010: 2) and expecting this is actually 
risky because it ‘may omit or even override 
state bodies that “ought” to take responsibility 
for regulation’ (Tallontire 2007: 779). 
 
Initiatives aimed at improving our social lives 
outside the realm of the state and/or harmful 
(business) practices are certainly laudable. But 
these initiatives are not sufficient to change the 
tide. As Susan George in Shadow Governs: 
How Global Corporations are Seizing Power 
argues, corporations have just become too 
strong. With tax evasion and concerns about 
accountability, it is clear that multinationals are 
‘increasingly distant from direct legal mecha-
nisms to hold them to account by the state’ 
(Barrientos and Smith 2007: 717). This creates 
a democratic deficit that cannot be solved by 
bottom-up approaches only. Whether we like it 
or not, to bring about meaningful change I think 
we still have to rely on the state – just in a dif-
ferent form from the current one!  
  The difficulty with the state is that it can 
be detrimental to the lives of many of its citi-
zens. States have substantially contributed to 
the race to the bottom in attracting corporations 
with tax incentives, to lowering standards in 
their aims to attract FDI, and to favouring geo-
political considerations over its citizenry, as I 
have shown elsewhere. Yet, at the same time 
the state is also an important vehicle for 
change. What other viable option do we have to 
regulate (and limit) the power of corporate ac-
tors? To change from insufficient voluntary 
codes of conduct to applying legal means to 
reduce the negative impact of corporate prac-
tices? Governments still seem to be the main 
force that can curtail the damaging corporate 
practices and improve conditions across the 
board by balancing the interests of different 
parts of the societies they govern, of which the 
corporate sector is only one. Its central role in 
taxing its citizens, which may potentially be ap-
plied to the benefit of all (think about services 
and infrastructure), furthermore indicates that 
the state remains essential to the organisation 
of our everyday lives – at least, for the foresee-
able future.  
 
Building further on the belief that external pres-
sure is not necessarily without results, concerns 
and initiatives aimed at change should more 
explicitly target governments and politicians. A 
renewed role of the state in regulating economic 
practices should be demanded. The state 
should be claimed back, in other words. Public 
institutions are needed to ‘resolve a set of col-
lective action problems that private actors can-
not overcome on their own’ (Locke 2013: 17). 
Governments should set the conditions for 
business since it has become evident that vol-
untary promises and codes of conduct are not 
sufficient. Resonating Galbraith’s countervailing 
power, Robert B. Reich argues in Saving Capi-
talism that a push in the direction of more equi-
table outcomes is actually inevitable, as we 
cannot continue in the direction we are now 
heading.  
 
Governments should take moral responsibility 
for pushing for fairer outcomes, including when 
it concerns people elsewhere in the world: ‘one 
cannot load the whole development agenda 
onto the shoulders of […] private firms, or ex-
pect them to behave as non-profit entities’ (Ber-
degué et al 2011: 165). States have to provide 
regulatory frameworks that aim at an equal dis-
tribution of gains and a reduction of harm. 
When corporations and other private-sector 
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actors are subject to comprehensive (and 
equally binding) regulation and oversight, their 
standard business approaches may actually 
bring more prosperity than if corporations are 
expected to be directly responsible for, for ex-
ample, alleviating poverty and diminishing hun-
ger. Accordingly, a clear division of roles is 
needed.  
 
In a recent interview, Stuart Kirsch, the author 
of the insightful Mining Capitalism: The Rela-
tionship Between Corporations and their Critics, 
argues that, contrary to the belief that postcolo-
nial states’ acquisition of ownership stakes in 
resource extraction projects would redistribute 
wealth – since overseas shareholders would no 
longer siphon off all profits – this has actually 
led to a consequential conflict of interest:  
 
[T]he state would have to weigh its 
mandate to protect people and the envi-
ronment through regulation against its 
desire to maximize revenue as an inves-
tor and tax collector. For Papua New 
Guinea, this has meant that the state 
aligns itself with the interests of the min-
ing industry over the rights of its own cit-
izens and the environment, with often-
disastrous consequences. 
 
I do not hold a grudge against business, or 
even multinational corporations, yet our lives 
depend on more than market thinking alone. 
Pressure on corporations should certainly re-
main, but we should realise that they, as illus-
trated above, have a different mandate. That 
does not necessarily mean a corrupt mandate. 
But society is the sum of different cultural, so-
cial, economic, and environmental aspects. 
Apart from citizens and economic enterprises, it 
is particularly the state – and politics – that have 
a responsibility to balance these interests.  
 Press politicians to rethink their ap-
proach and become more ideological. We can-
not have equitable outcomes when too much 
power remains in the hands of the corporate 
world. Politicians must be drawn back into poli-
tics. In powerful states, they must be pressured 
to take on the task of improving the conditions 
in more vulnerable states, to hold corporations 
operating in their constituencies accountable for 
their actions – and tax avoidance – elsewhere, 
such as in Africa. Governments should be 
pushed to reconsider their approach towards 
corporations and (international) business. In-
stead of hoping that flimsy voluntary promises 
will do the trick abroad, the situation should be 
turned upside down. Corporations should be 
forced to stick to the same standards as the 
states where they domicile. Why allow, as Nor-
way does, the national oil company to operate 
in notoriously corrupt Angola? Why not apply 
similar labour standards to textile factories in 
Bangladesh as in Europe?  
 
Such an approach would also avoid states’ re-
luctance to enforce their norms upon other 
states. Corporations just have to stick to the 
rules and laws of a particular state when they 
want to do business with it. Tell overseas pro-
ducers or traders that they can only sell their 
produce when they obey the same standards 
abroad. But what about when similar laws al-
ready exist abroad, yet these are barely en-
forced? Demand from corporations that they 
commit to empowering governments with weak 
regulatory capacity (in Africa, South Asia or 
elsewhere) so that these laws can be meaning-
fully enforced. Without doubt this will also in-
volve paying a much fairer share of tax, as only 
then will many of the states be able improve 
their capacities. But so be it. We have waited in 
vain for real change coming from corporations. 
Voluntary commitments are just not enough. 
But this does not imply an either/or situation: 
even in a more ethical setting and/or within rela-
tively strict operating legal systems, economic 
enterprises can make a profit. To accomplish 
this, I would say that for now our best hope is to 
push states to reconsider their mandate, to take 
it up for the most vulnerable instead of powerful 
corporations, to put their citizens first. One has 
to remain vigilant of the state, but also realise 
that pressure may work. Change is not impos-
sible, though neither is it a one-way path to-
wards utopia – or dystopia, for that matter. It is, 
as I have suggested, probably a neverending 
‘struggle’ – but not one in which people are 
powerless by definition.  
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SOLIDARITY, ETHNOGRAPHY, AND THE 
DEINSTITUTION OF DISSENT 
 
by Theodoros Rakopoulos (University of Ber-
gen) 
 
Originally published at Journal of Modern Greek 
Studies, Occasional paper 6, available at: 
https://www.press.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_m
odern_greek_studies/Theodoros_Rakopoulos.p
df 
  
As an anthropologist, I think in terms of the in-
tersubjective constitution of knowledge among 
people who claim and use notions and terms “in 
the field” – that is, while doing fieldwork in a 
spatially defined social area of interest, as well 
as in the public sphere. In this context, I have 
been involved in deciphering and exploring the 
varied vicissitudes of one heated term that has 
become particularly salient in the vocabulary of 
the crisis, namely solidarity. 
 
While investigating the grassroots ramifications 
of solidarity in one form of mobilization, the anti-
middleman movement (Rakopoulos 2014a), I 
came across different usages and understand-
ings of the term. The tensions and contradic-
tions at play, when dealing with such a political-
ly imbricated notion, the various claims placed 
on it and the antagonisms contesting the purity 
and clarity of its practice partly formed the core 
of my interest but were also salient among the 
participants of solidarity economy networks. By 
2013, many dozens of activist groups across 
Greece were involved in this movement of food 
distribution without market middlemen. Since 
then, a diffusion and expansion into other forms 
of mobilization has taken place. More specifical-
ly, the grassroots groups committed to such 
praxis have diminished in numbers as other 
organizational arrangements (such as munici-
palities) entered the scene shaping the solidari-
ty economy food distribution movement. 
 
Solidarity was defined in quite clear formations 
by my research participants at the time, as a 
form of “mobilizing others” (Rakopoulos 2015) 
and, as I discussed in a recent Journal of Mod-
ern Greek Studies article, in terms of a strict 
antithesis to austerity (Rakopoulos 2014b). 
Some of this tendency developed in a move-
ment upheld by the Left coalition party SYRIZA 
(among other players) and instigated a partial 
institutionalization of the social mobilization 
around food. Following and echoing this, the 
idea of solidarity started transforming from a 
politically loaded discursive feature of political 
education to one that cross-fertilized with other, 
similar ideas (from charity to networking to com-
radeship). Discussions (and fears) of co-
optation were rampant among many research 
participants throughout this course of events, 
along with a (still present) discussion of “confer-
ring” movemental impetus to the institutional 
Left, which was expressed in participants’ wait-
ing for a Left government’s friendly embrace 
while conferring some of their enthusiasm to 
that prospect. On some occasions, this expec-
tation and enthusiasm eventually translated into 
a yearning towards institutional change rather 
than towards grassroots relief, and, to an ex-
tent, in the process pushed the movement to 
work in that direction. The idea is often dis-
cussed in Greek movement circles as anathesi 
(ανάθεση) or he logiki tis anathesis - the logic of 
conferring.  
  
Of course, not all solidarity economy is Left-
inspired or even socially progressive. Solidarity, 
a politicized reclaiming of charity but also—and 
crucially so—of reciprocity, opens up the dis-
cursive field of similarity and difference. Solidar-
ity participants become engaged in sociality 
practices premised on ideas of egalitarianism, 
and see the receivers of their provisions as 
equals. However, this—often-imagined—
equality can push in the direction of identitary 
similarity, which is how the neo-Nazi organiza-
tion Golden Dawn has laid claims for an “ethni-
cally pure” solidarity. The neo-Nazi party’s dis-
course on the purity of racial “egalitarianism” (a 
contradiction in terms on its own) demands that 
Greeks be considered similars and be treated 
equally while all others be excluded from the 
party’s own (and in any case short-lived) soli-
darity networks.  
  
The solidarity economy is actively anti-austerity 
and did not form as a provisional remedy to the 
dismantling of the welfare state, but rather as a 
political contestation of that prospect. In this 
way, the mobilization went hand in hand with 
the Left. However, many activists detect a re-
cent shift in the positions of SYRIZA (the main 
contingent in the government since the elec-
tions held in January and, again, in September 
2015) towards austerity. This shift seems to 
imply a turn from outright animosity towards 
austerity (an animosity that almost constituted a 
politically ontological differentiation from the 
pro-austerity parties), to an ambiguous em-
bracement of positions that resemble tenets of 
liberal pragmatism. The new position attributed 
to SYRIZA with regard to austerity has serious 
repercussions for the solidarity economy, espe-
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cially on its dialectical stake between the grass-
roots movement and the state.  
  
This change might give impetus to the solidarity 
economy, after a period of hibernation. The 
transformation of SYRIZA from a dissent-driven 
party to a pragmatism-centered administrative 
apparatus not only allows for renewed dissent 
among activists, but it also signals the shifting 
center of dissent from the once radically and 
vocally anti-austerity party that institutionalized 
it to more loosely structured entities. This is 
what I call “the de-instituting of dissent” in 
Greece. It might be a process that affects, if not 
indeed reverses, the “conferral politics” period 
that some solidarity movements and networks 
have gone through. Many research participants 
with whom I have talked over a period of time 
(around three years) have said that they have 
been gradually withdrawing their consent from 
the institutionalized politics implied by “the logic 
of conferring.” Undoubtedly, this process is not 
yet fully visible or tangible,  but speaking with 
solidarity economy participants on the ground 
reveals their shared disappointment about aus-
terity and lack of support for the movement by 
the state, a disappointment that points towards 
a reshuffling of the relationship between the 
movement and the state. 
  
This potentially new relationship between par-
ty/government and movement/solidarity econo-
my has been heatedly discussed. Some try to 
draw new lines between the desire for the pre-
sent expressed in the movements and the 
pragmatics of (what Stathis Gourgouris has 
called) “Left governmentality” that is organized 
by external factors (Gourgouris 2015). Yet oth-
ers see party and movement as antithetical. 
These latter voices argue that the social move-
ments have been tricked into waiting for SYRI-
ZA to deliver on its promises and that left prag-
matism will destroy whatever solidarity econo-
my stands for (Karyotis 2015).  
  
For me, the new configuration implies, first and 
foremost, that the institutionalization of solidari-
ty, that is to say, the alleged passing of solidari-
ty activity from a grassroots to a statal level that 
happened with the national elections in January 
2015, which could have affected its political 
underpinnings, might now be prone to a serious 
disorientation process. In fact, it might even be 
diminished as a process, as many activists see 
(what they call) a “defeat” of SYRIZA in terms of 
the party’s position towards anti-austerity, and 
underscore that only a return to radical social 
movements could salvage the solidarity econo-
my of Greece. It is a fascinating turning point 
and it remains to be seen how things will devel-
op. It certainly requires more fieldwork.  
  
Let me then revisit the point that opened this 
piece. The processual making of terms such as 
solidarity, when its meanings become aug-
mented under the present conditions of crisis, 
can involve subjects as widely different as un-
employed youngsters in working class suburbs 
of Volos, or US academics. In mid-July 2015 
Heath Cabot, an anthropologist colleague, and I 
organized a panel on solidarity networks for the 
conference “Democracy Rising” (organized in 
Athens by the leftist Global Centre for Ad-
vanced Studies). The panel was received with 
great enthusiasm and genuine international 
interest for the issues we are researching.  
  
Cabot and I worked hard to bring together an-
thropologists interested in how the urgency of 
the notion is understood on the local level in 
crisis-ridden Greece. We discussed solidarity 
from an anthropological point of view, while 
stressing ethnography as a modality of compre-
hending its various political vicissitudes in con-
temporary Greece. I found the enthusiastic re-
ception of our panel thrilling, and indeed prom-
ising of new research horizons. However, I also 
came across certain debatable and slippery 
remarks on solidarity in other discussions and 
panels that took place during the conference, 
where the term was invested with varying de-
grees of politicized voluntarism. In an electrified 
atmosphere during a plenary discussion,3 Uni-
versity of Toronto political economist Leo Pa-
nitch praised the solidarity networks of Greece 
as the way of all socialism, or at least a mode of 
development for the country. Panitch argued 
about the (administration of the) future, some-
thing that has been a stake for the Left since 
Leninist and Gramscian times, stressing that 
the future of the Greek economy at large lies 
with the grassroots solidarity networks. He em-
phatically noted how, in the sophisticated soli-
darity economies on the ground, Greeks have 
“already” engendered the conditions for surpas-
sing neoliberal capitalism at a future stage. He 
specifically stressed the role of the organization 
Solidarity4all in organizing solidarity as a future 
prospect for the country.  
 
                                                
3 The discussion also involved LSE economist and 
then MP of SYRIZA Costas Lapavitsas, Birkbeck legal 
scholar and current MP Costas Douzinas, and Colum-
bia University comparatist Stathis Gourgouris.  
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 Is this a way to romanticize the solidarity 
economy or to overestimate its potential? My 
provisional answer is that both romanticization 
and overestimation are present here. The two, 
in fact, feed into each other and are exaggerat-
ed by the overall attention paid to Greece as the 
solidarity movement is gaining momentum. That 
is, a visiting intellectual such as Leo Panitch, 
despite his firm grasp on international (critique 
of) political economy, can see Greece in the 
spotlight of current events and aim to extrapo-
late from that a broader argument of political 
economy based on (apparently) thin evidence 
regarding matters on the ground. One wonders 
if soup kitchens, anti-middleman markets, or 
social pharmacies can formulate the basis for 
change of the political economy on a higher 
level (in this case that of the country as a 
whole). To go back to my earlier point on the 
relation between state and movement, Leo Pa-
nitch does not seem to acknowledge the wor-
ries of many solidarity participants that the state 
has penetrated and indeed capitalized on the 
grassroots solidarity economy (a point also 
made by Cabot in her piece in this section).  
 
I have deep respect for the work and scholar-
ship of Leo Panitch—which is why I see this 
position of his as an indication of a wider prob-
lem. Having conducted fieldwork with the anti-
middleman movement and solidarity networks I 
have seen a different reality on the ground that 
allows me to argue that the position of Panitch 
in this regard unfortunately remains on the level 
of “recipes for the kitchens of the future” (to 
invoke an ironic and iconic phrase of Karl Marx 
in Volume I of Das Kapital). These distribution 
networks cannot shoulder the responsibility for 
a generalized paradigm shift; neither can they 
uphold the entire framework of the country's 
political economy (especially if shortages of 
imported basic resources, such as petrol and 
pharmaceuticals, become a real possibility). 
  
The issue of solidarity economy is thus closely 
related to another problematic that centers on 
the question of why ethnography is not merely 
significant but necessary. We need more re-
search on solidarity, and indeed participant ob-
servation for long periods among the activists of 
current solidarity economies, since these reali-
ties on the ground are shifting and transmogrify-
ing quickly. Only immersed, sustained, and in-
volved ethnography can capture the subtleties 
of such changes. 
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MONEY’S SOCIALIST POTENTIAL – A 
MAUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE 
 
by Mario Schmidt (a.r.t.e.s. Graduate School for 
the Humanities, University of Cologne, and 
DFG Research Training Group "Value and 
Equivalence", Goethe University Frankfurt am 
Main) 
 
It is rather common among anthropologists to 
assume that Marcel Mauss – gift theoretician, 
socialist, and self-proclaimed political economist 
(Mauss 1924) – would have embraced several 
recently circulating economic ideas that can be 
subsumed under the label “sharing economy”. 
These ideas claim to be able to correct short-
comings of the current neoliberal free-market 
capitalism through the abolishment or sidelining 
of money (see Hahn 2012). They are not only 
proposed as viable means to reduce massive 
wealth inequalities but also hailed as solutions 
to the urgent ecological problems of our times. 
The assumption that Mauss’ economic theory 
supports a primacy of non-monetary sharing 
activities, a “gift economy”, is, however, short-
sighted. In contrast to this, his discussion of the 
Bolshevists’ failed attempt to get rid of money 
(Mauss 1997) and his reluctance to propose a 
“gift economy” as a feasible alternative to a 
monetary market economy regulated by the 
state and intermediary associations such as 
trade unions (Mauss 2002: 98-99), professional 
associations each possessing their own ethics 
(Mauss 1969a) and worker- as well as consum-
er-cooperatives (Mauss 1901, 1920, 1997: 541-
542) illustrate that Mauss was rather critical of 
utopian ideas that were trying to overturn an 
economic system based on money and a free 
market: 
 
“It was even more absurd to assume that in 
order to bring socialism into being it would be 
necessary to destroy what constitutes an econ-
omy to begin with, namely the market. […] it is 
the organization of the market, not its oppres-
sion, that socialism – i.e. communism – must 
look out for. […] The majority of socialist theo-
ries have […] predicted that future societies 
would be able to get rid of money. The com-
munist experience has proved the contrary.” 
(1997:541-542)4 
 
Mauss, however, did perceive money as a high-
ly ambivalent concept. Money is, on one hand, 
a “good” medium producing and mediating the 
                                                
4 All translations are my own. For a German translation of 
Mauss‘ articles on money see Mauss (2015). 
information necessary to organize an economy, 
i.e. a medium providing information about eco-
nomic actors’ demands and about their willing-
ness and ability to take risks in order to make 
profits.5 On the other, money potentially turns 
into a “bad” catalyst of unjust relations between 
members of different social classes. This se-
cond property originates in another crucial “par-
adox of money”, namely that, at least in capital-
ist economies, money is used as a medium that 
indexes simultaneously the demands of its 
owner and the “price” of every person, i.e. the 
value of its labor power, its credit standing, and 
the multiple insurance contributions each per-
son has to pay in order to enjoy insurance cov-
erage. This bifurcation of money’s indexing abil-
ity is a precondition for the bifurcation of capital-
ist societies into actors who invest, i.e. capital-
ists, the finance sector and insurance compa-
nies; and actors in whom the investors invest, 
i.e. workers, debtors, and insurants (Mauss 
1969b: 111, Polanyi 1957).6 The peculiarity of 
Mauss’ politico-economic ideas is now the as-
sumption that the ambivalent nature of money 
can be exploited for socialist goals. He sug-
gests that money’s “good” property can be used 
to ward off its “bad” trait, i.e. money’s ability to 
bring forth and solidify social, political, and eco-
nomic inequality can be tamed by organizing 
money’s potential to provide information in a 
collective, socialist, and more just way. In other 
words: Mauss attempts to exploit money’s ne-
oliberal virtues (its ability to produce and medi-
ate information) for the fight against neoliberal-
ism’s vices (unjust socio-economic relations). 
Mauss’ theory thereby occupies a unique posi-
tion in the scholarly and politically enacted fight 
between neoliberals who claim that money is a 
necessary but “neutral” medium for an econo-
my’s organization (Hayek 1945), and socialists, 
communists, or some adherents of a “sharing 
economy” who claim that money itself is the 
root of all evil.  
 
But what economic activities or ideas are sub-
sumed under the rather elusive notion “sharing 
economy”? It is helpful to distinguish at least 
two different types of economic activity: on one 
hand there are proper sharing activities where 
either the burden of the price to buy an object or 
the burden of finding capital for an investment is 
shared. Examples of the first type include pro-
                                                
5 On the Socialist Calculation Debate see Auer-
bach/Sotiropoulos (2012). 
6 Ultimately Mauss, like Marx and proponents of the German 
Historical School of Economics (e.g. Hildebrand 1922), views it 
as highly problematic that the class structure of capitalism pre-
vents workers from raising enough capital in order to invest.  
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fessionally organized car-sharing (for example 
Zipcar) or shared flats; an example of the latter 
is crowdfunding. On the other hand there are 
redistribution systems whose participants get rid 
of goods they no longer use by either selling, 
exchanging, or giving them away freely (for in-
stance on eBay, craigslist, Swap.com etc.). 
Leaving aside those profit-oriented activities 
that consider more and more types of goods in 
terms of the capitalist logic of renting these out 
to people who do not possess the means to buy 
them (from apartments to cars to tools), private-
ly organized expenditure (buying one car for 
five persons) and privately organized invest-
ment (crowdfunding), which combine the pur-
chasing and investment power of several indi-
viduals in order to at least partially mark their 
demand in the market, build upon the same 
principles as and share the main objectives with 
consumer-cooperatives: to open up markets for 
people who do not possess the means to enter 
them. It is nevertheless rather short-sighted to 
assume that any sharing activity proceeding 
along these lines is inherently more socialist 
than the individual purchase of a good. Without 
proper political and social institutionalization 
these sharing activities forego the potential to 
become visible as being anchored in the politi-
cal will of associations constituted by several 
economic actors and thereby miss the chance 
to challenge the capitalist equation of “1 individ-
ual human being = 1 economic actor”.  
 
Adherents of a sharing economy, however, 
rarely refer to socio-economic problems as the 
main target of their activities. They rather claim 
to offer an alternative to capitalism’s allegedly 
irrational belief in continuous growth that, sup-
posedly necessarily, causes irreversible ecolog-
ical damage.7 By performing activities such as 
sharing food or even “stealing” food thrown 
away by supermarkets they attempt to contrib-
ute to a “degrowth” of our economic system 
(Latouche 2007). Instead of using money’s de-
mand-indexing potential, they abstain from us-
ing money at all. The logic behind these activi-
ties neglects that capitalism’s inherent unity with 
financialization is built upon the principle that 
money not used by its “owner” – at least as long 
as she stores it in a bank account – is used by 
other people. It is thus at least questionable to 
view redistribution activities that deliberately 
function without money – for instance food 
banks or sharing platforms – as economic activ-
ities at all: they neither enforce the production 
                                                
7 Cf. the Convivialist Manifesto (2014) for an explicitly Maussi-
an argument along these lines. 
or non-production of goods nor index the de-
mands or the willingness to take risks.  
 
In contrast with this, suggestions favored by 
Mauss – the introduction of additional property 
concepts beyond that of property owned by 
individuals, i.e. national property, property be-
longing to a specific local or professional group 
(Mauss 1997: 546); alternative taxation systems 
(Mauss 1922b) that would make sure that the 
rich once more become the “financial guardians 
of their fellow citizens”  (Mauss 2002: 88); 
workers’ participation in the decision as to how 
a company’s capital is invested; or the combina-
tion of individual actors’ purchasing power 
through the formation of consumer-cooperatives 
– are intended to balance the socio-economic 
inequalities brought forth by differences be-
tween the abilities of members of diverse social 
classes to inform others of their own demands 
and investment potentials. The problem is 
therefore not that markets for goods, capital, 
and risk exist, but that some economic actors 
are structurally unable to participate adequately 
in these markets, because they do not possess 
the medium necessary to do so, i.e. money. 
Precisely because buying something – as much 
a “total social phenomenon” (Mauss 2002: 3) as 
giving a gift on the Trobriand Islands (Mauss 
2002: 27-39) – and investing – as much 
grounded in the competition between actors as 
the destruction of wealth on North America’s 
Northwest Coast (Mauss 2002: 42-59) – play a 
crucial role in the constitution of a society with a 
common destiny and shared expectations 
(Mauss et al. 2006, Aglietta and Orléans 1998), 
everybody’s full participation in the economy 
constitutes a human right (Hart et al. 2010).   
 
Far from being such a universal right, the de-
gree of participation in the capitalist economy is 
to a large extent a function of an individual’s 
position in the net of capitalist power relations. 
These power relations become manifest in a 
fundamental difference between capitalists’ and 
non-capitalists’ abilities to (1) index their de-
mand/investment potential, and to (2) access or 
creatively shift their debts on the financial mar-
ket – a necessary part of any functioning market 
economy because it generates prices for taking 
risks that subsequently organize investment 
(Marx 2004, Sotiropolous/Milios/Lapatsioras 
2013, Keynes 2007, Mauss 1922a). The main 
problems of a monetary market economy that 
does not function properly and justly are there-
fore consequences of the specific arrangement 
of the politico-economic relations between 
members of diverse social classes, and Mauss’ 
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chief goal was to replace these oppressive capi-
talist power relations with a socialist alternative: 
syndicalistically organized factories which would 
nevertheless continue to depend on taking risks 
by lending money from communally organized 
credit unions (Mauss 1997: 543)8 at a price es-
tablished by the mechanisms of a free market, 
whereby society itself would become the “main 
dispenser of credit” (Mauss 1997:543).9 In other 
words: Mauss did not want to replace the free-
dom of individual entrepreneurs with the coer-
cion of the state, as he accuses the Bolshevists 
of doing (Mauss 1997: 547-556), but rather he 
believed in a social and economic superiority of 
political and collective associations whose 
members decide voluntarily to unite themselves 
with one another in order to increase their eco-
nomic influence and productivity.  
 
By way of conclusion it can be said that, from a 
Maussian perspective, money does not neces-
sarily impede the emancipation of the poorer 
segments of a society, but – if its ability to me-
diate and produce information is socialistically 
exploited – it offers an excellent and democratic 
entry point from which to change our societies 
to the better. As a “fetishistic” (Mauss 2006:259) 
entity mediating and at the same time producing 
a society’s expectations, money seems to be 
doomed to be viewed either as a demonic de-
vice leading to encompassing poverty or as a 
soothing savior bringing forth a more just socie-
ty. In contrast to this rigid dichotomy, Mauss’ 
main politico-economic insight, namely that 
money must always be used in specific ways, of 
which some can be beneficial to our society 
while others might not, can ignite hope for a 
more just, as well as more human, future econ-
omy.  
 
  
                                                
8 Recently my colleague Kai Koddenbrock told me about the 
interesting idea of establishing so-called “debtors’ unions”, 
collective organizations that combine the aggregate power of 
debtors to achieve shared goals (debt relief, better interest rates 
etc.) by diverse collective actions (collective non-payment, 
providing legal advice etc.), see for an example: 
http://edudebtorsunion.org/wp/. 
9 If the society as a whole becomes the main dispenser of credit, 
each individual is by definition liable for any defaulting debtor 
and defaulting on one’s own debts transforms from an individual 
violation into a problem that must be solved collectively (Grae-
ber 2011).  
	   Multilingualism in the Global South (and beyond) - Voices from around the world  
Global South Studies Center, University of Cologne, Germany - http://gssc.uni-­‐koeln.de/node/927 
Refernces: 
 
Aglietta, Michel and André Orléans (1998): La 
Monnaie Souveraine. Paris: Jacob. 
 
Auerbach, Paul und Dimitris P. Sotiropoulos 
(2012): “Revisiting the Socialist Calculation De-
bate: The Role of Markets and Finance in Hay-
ek’s Response to Lange’s Challenge.” Econom-
ics Discussion Paper 2012-6, Kingston Univer-
sity London. 
 
Convivialist Manifesto. A declaration of interde-
pendence (2014). Duisburg: Käte Hamburger 
Kolleg/Centre for Global Cooperation Research 
(Global Dialogues 3, KHK/GCR21). 
 
Graeber, David (2011): Debt. The first 5,000 Years. 
New York: Melville House. 
 
Hahn, Hans Peter (2012): “Keine Gesellschaft 
kann ohne den Austausch von Gaben existie-
ren. Warum Tauschringe durch Geld nicht ob-
solet werden.” In: Forschung Frankfurt 2012 (2): 
90-93. 
 
Hart, Keith; Laville, Jean-Louis and David Antonio 
Cattani (2010) (eds.): The Human Economy. A 
Citizen’s Guide. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Hayek, Friedrich A. von (1945): “The Use of 
Knowledge in Society.” In: American Economic 
Review 35 (4): 519-530. 
 
Hildebrand, Bruno (1922): “Natural-, Geld- und 
Kreditwirtschaft.” In: Hildebrand, Bruno: Die 
Nationalökonomie der Gegenwart und Zukunft 
und andere gesammelte Schriften 1. Jena: Gus-
tav Fischer, 325-357. 
 
Keynes, John Maynard (2007): The General 
Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. 
London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Latouche, Serge (2007): Petit traité de la décrois-
sance sereine. Paris: Fayard. 
 
Mauss, Marcel (1997): “Appréciation sociologique 
du bolchevisme.“ In: Fournier, Marcel (ed.): 
Écrits politiques. Paris: Fayard, 537-566. 
 
Mauss, Marcel et al. (2006): “Débat sur les fonc-
tions sociales de la monnaie (1934).“ In: Stei-
ner, Philippe and Jean-Christophe Marcel 
(eds.): Critique sociologique de l´économie. 
Paris: PUF, 259-279. 
 
Mauss, Marcel (1969a): “Introduction à la ‘Morale 
professionnelle‘ de É. Durkheim.“ In: Kara-
dy,Victor (ed.): Œuvres III. Paris: Minuit, 500-
505. 
 
Marcel Mauss (1922a): “Les Changes III. Danger 
des mesures arbitraries.“ In: Le Populaire, 9th 
December: 2. 
 
Mauss, Marcel (1924): “Les Changes. L’inflation 
de francs.” In: Le Populaire, 29. Februar: 1-2.  
 
Mauss, Marcel (1922b): “Les Changes V. Com-
ment liquider; comment stabiliser.“ In: Le Popu-
laire, 13th December: 1-2. 
 
Mauss, Marcel (1901): “Les coopératives et les 
socialistes.“ In: Le Mouvement socialiste, 1st 
February: 135-138. 
 
Mauss, Marcel (1920): “Les coopératives russes.“ 
In: La Revue de Paris 27 (2), März-April: 96-
121. 
 
Mauss, Marcel (1969b): “Les origines de la notion 
de monnaie“. In Karady, Victor (ed.): Œuvres II. 
Paris: Minuit, 106-112.  
 
Mauss, Marcel (2015, edited by Hans Peter Hahn, 
Mario Schmidt and Emanuel Seitz): Schriften 
zum Geld. Berlin: Suhrkamp. 
 
Mauss, Marcel (2002): The Gift. The Form and 
Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies. 
London: Routledge. 
 
Marx, Karl (2004): Das Kapital. Dritter Band: Der 
Gesamtprozess der kapitalistischen Produktion. 
Berlin: Dietz. 
 
Polanyi, Karl (1957): The Great Transformation. 
Boston: Beacon Press. 
 
Sotiropoulos, Dimitris; Milios, John and Spyros 
Lapatsioras (2013): A Political Economy of Con-
temporary Capitalism and its Crisis: Demystify-
ing Finance. London: Routledge.  
 
 
  
	   Multilingualism in the Global South (and beyond) - Voices from around the world  
Global South Studies Center, University of Cologne, Germany - http://gssc.uni-­‐koeln.de/node/927 
LIVING WITH MONEY IN INDIAN AND 
AUSTRALIAN FAMILIES 
 
By Supriya Singh (Professor of Sociology of 
Communications, RMIT Melbourne) 
 
Growing up in India, I had taken for granted 
some aspects of living with money. I belonged 
to a refugee family who had moved from Kara-
chi to Delhi at the Partition of India in 1947. My 
father started his medical practice again in Del-
hi. But my eldest sister, who began working in 
Delhi, also contributed her wages. My mother 
also brought in some money from teaching Pun-
jabi in school. This pooled money was used for 
the family. It was ‘our money’. The boundary of 
family money after Partition focused on the nu-
clear family. Before Partition, only my father 
was in paid work. But significant monetary sup-
port and gifts in kind flowed from my mother’s 
grandmother when she was alive, and from 
extended kin.   
 
Parents gave money to their children, and chil-
dren gave money to their parents. My sisters 
moved away from home, but continued to send 
money to supplement the household income. 
For two years, my eldest sister took the respon-
sibility of paying for my education in a residen-
tial school. There were times when my second 
sister’s remittances paid the food bill. When I 
began to live and work in Malaysia, I too sent 
money to my mother. She did not need the 
money for food, but it was additional discretion-
ary income. Often she kept most of it aside to 
gift to me when I visited her.  
 
Growing up, my mother and I talked openly 
about money. By then, she had become the 
main wage-earner. I knew the household in-
come and expenditure and hence knew how 
much money was available to spend and share. 
In later years when I was in Malaysia and Aus-
tralia, my uncle – my mother’s brother – would 
also ask if I was financially alright. It was not an 
idle question: he wanted to know if he could 
help with money, and he did.   
 
I grew up receiving gifts of money on birthdays 
or when relatives came to stay. And when it 
was my turn, I also gave the ritual money gift, 
the shagun, packaged in specially decorated 
envelopes. This was prompted at births and 
marriages, or when a newborn child or married 
couple visited my home for the first time. When 
leaving a family home after a visit, it was man-
datory to give shagun to younger relatives.   
 
I accepted without question that the amount 
must be ritually auspicious – Rs 101 rather than 
Rs 100, Rs 501 rather than Rs 500. How much 
to give was usually something I discussed with 
my mother. The social calculation took into ac-
count the history and quality of relationship and 
the give and take that had happened between 
the two families. It had to be an amount that 
reflected relationship as well as capacity. After 
my mother died I often got it wrong, not being 
able to gauge the adjusted amounts taking into 
account inflation and the different standards in 
metropolitan cities and small towns.   
 
In the main I had developed a rosy picture of 
money in families in India. I heard stories and 
saw films of older people being abused by their 
children. Disputes over inheritance were rife 
(Singh, Forthcoming). However, the norms 
around money as a medium of care remained 
unshaken.  
 
My sureties around money were challenged 
when I moved to Australia in 1986. Money was 
not seen as an appropriate gift. Grandparents 
often put cash in the birthday cards, but in gen-
eral, money was seen as impersonal and sig-
naled a lack of care. This is changing slowly 
with a greater number of de facto marriages 
and remarriages. In some of these cases, there 
is an explicit request for cash contributions. This 
happened with my oldest Anglo-Celtic friend’s 
daughter’s marriage, though with a big dollop of 
embarrassment. My friend found that most of 
the guests put in less than they would have 
spent on a present. There was little social guid-
ance about the calculability of these money 
gifts. But the gift of cash elicited a thank you 
note just as a packaged gift. I received a ‘thank 
you’ card from my friend’s daughter and her 
husband saying that the money would go to-
wards their carport. However, soon afterwards 
they sold their house.  
Attitudes are also changing because of relation-
ships with other cultural groups in a multicultural 
Australia. In mid-2015 I went with the same 
Anglo-Celtic friend to a Somalian wedding in 
Melbourne. She had an important relationship 
with the family and gave them a set of beautiful 
glasses. I gave the mother of the groom an en-
velope containing money. Even today my friend 
talks of how normally the groom’s mother ac-
cepted the envelope.  
 
	   Multilingualism in the Global South (and beyond) - Voices from around the world  
Global South Studies Center, University of Cologne, Germany - http://gssc.uni-­‐koeln.de/node/927 
The emotional understanding that the way 
money is treated in Anglo-Celtic families in Aus-
tralia differed from my experience in India came 
with my 1990s study of money in marriage and 
banking among middle-income Anglo-Celtic 
couples in Melbourne (Singh, 1997). I met a 
couple that was going through difficult times, 
but they had not talked about money with their 
adult children, who were still living at home. 
Another father said he did not ask his married 
children how they were doing in terms of mon-
ey. Talking about money, he said, was like talk-
ing about sex. He sees they have a bought a 
new car and they have a good home; he sur-
mises they are doing alright.  
 
My participants in the study did not give money 
to their parents. Money went only one way. 
Parents and grandparents gave money to chil-
dren and grandchildren while they were young, 
but money did not flow back up the generations. 
There was one family group where the son and 
his family lived in an upper-middle-class suburb 
with a beautiful home, while his parents lived in 
council housing in a low- to middle-income sub-
urb. With my own experience in mind, I asked 
his mother whether the son gave her money. 
She said she did not expect him to do that; he 
had his own responsibilities. Moreover, she said 
they, the parents, had enough and could man-
age with the welfare payments and any savings 
they had. She valued her independence.   
 
This way of dealing with money in the family 
questioned my moral compass. When I sent 
money to my mother, she would talk of it proud-
ly in inflated terms, for it meant she had raised a 
filial daughter. The morality of money in my cul-
ture revolved around reciprocal care between 
parents and children. I had grown up with sto-
ries about how a person’s place in the world 
was displayed by how well he or she looked 
after his or her parents. When my mother told of 
how her grandfather and his brother had be-
come rich, the story was about how her grand-
father’s mother no longer went out to work but 
could sit at home wearing heavy gold bracelets. 
The world knew she had sons who were doing 
well and were filial (Singh, 2013a). After this 
disturbing interview, I told my 20-year old son, 
who was living with me in Melbourne, that if he 
wanted to give me money when I was older, I 
would gladly accept it.  
 
Reflecting on this and other interviews, I real-
ized that the story differed with regard to mon-
ey, but not with regard to care in the family. The 
people I studied showed care, but not by giving 
money. One mother’s son showed caring by 
telephoning and visiting her often. He mowed 
the garden, cleaned the gutters, and took her 
shopping, banking, and to the doctor. It was 
these family practices rather than money that 
“displayed” the quality of family relationships 
(Finch, 2007).  
 
The way money is treated within the family may 
change within the same cultural group across 
generations. The same mother who did not ex-
pect money from her son had her mother living 
with her and her husband till her mother died. 
Parents and grandparents giving money to adult 
children and grandchildren have increased with 
the rising price of housing. A 2005 Australian 
study of 7,000 persons over 50 years old – the 
majority were home owners – showed that more 
than one-third had helped their children finan-
cially to buy a home. Help was more often in the 
form of an informal loan with no interest than in 
the form of a gift. However, the parents did not 
expect care in return. Only 4.2 percent said they 
had moved or would move to live with their chil-
dren (Olsberg & Winters, 2005b). While study-
ing Anglo-Celtic families in Australia, I felt that 
the Indian way was unusual. But as I extended 
my work on money to the Global South, I found 
that money was an appropriate if not a pre-
ferred gift in Asia and the Pacific, Africa, and 
Latin America. Money travelled in both direc-
tions across generations in a family. It was this 
sharing of money in the family that has resulted 
in international remittances becoming one of the 
largest international flows of funds – greater 
than foreign aid and foreign direct investment in 
most developing countries (Singh, 2013b).  
 
It is the Global South that is now shaping the 
future of money. Next time around, perhaps my 
Anglo-Celtic friend will give an envelope con-
taining money at a Somalian wedding.  
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MONEY IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH 
 
By Supriya Singh (Professor of Sociology of 
Communications, RMIT Melbourne) 
 
 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NVbdv7zFY
3E&feature=youtu.be 
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CONTRIBUITIONS OF COMMERCIAL 
SMALL-SCALE FARMING TO FOOD 
ACCESSIBILITY – EXAMPLES FROM 
KENYA 
 
By Laura Pargen and Peter Dannenberg  
(Global South Studies Center, University of 
Cologne) 
 
Introduction 
In the context of a globalising world and a glob-
alising economy the problem of the existence of 
a large number of people still facing hunger and 
food insecurity has not been solved. Even fur-
ther, discussions have taken place about 
whether small-scale farmers in the Global South 
would be better off not engaging in global capi-
talism – e.g. through export production – but 
focusing instead on self-supply strategies in 
order to produce enough food and not become 
dependent on volatile markets, high prices, and 
the vicissitudes of the global food situation. 
However, such a self-supply strategy might run 
the risk of earning insufficient money for an ad-
equate and healthy diet. This paper offers evi-
dence that a mixed strategy of self-supply and 
commercial production can be a practical solu-
tion to achieve sufficient food security. 
  
Especially since the 1990s food security has 
emerged as a frequently discussed topic in re-
search and society. Annually, the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO) publishes a re-
port about ‘The State of Food Insecurity in the 
World’ (SOFI). These reports show that particu-
larly in Sub-Saharan Africa hunger is still a 
common problem. Furthermore, even those 
people who are not affected by hunger often 
lack a healthy diet. While especially hunger 
problems were mostly linked to the problem of 
food availability, more recent studies and ap-
plied work further focus on the dimension of 
food accessibility. In this context the purchasing 
power of a household is seen as key factor for 
accessing food. As a result, an often-discussed 
strategy for farmers is to move from subsist-
ence farming, with the aim of producing their 
own food directly, to a strategy of producing 
cash crops, most notably for export, in order to 
make money to buy food. Following this highly 
discussed argumentation this article is con-
cerned with the food access of commercial hor-
ticultural small-scale farmers in the Mount Ken-
ya region. The central questions include: What 
is the situation with regard to these farmers’ 
households’ food access? What does the case 
of food access of commercial horticultural 
small-scale farmers in the Mount Kenya region 
teach us about issues of food security? What 
variables influence their households’ food ac-
cess? To what extent does the households’ 
involvement in commercial horticulture, and 
global markets, influence the situation of food 
access, and therefore food security?  
 
Food Security and Access to Food 
Food security is given when “all people, at all 
times, have physical and economic access to 
sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their 
dietary needs and food preferences for an ac-
tive and healthy life” (FAO 1996). Following 
Ingram (2011), guided by the FAO definition, 
this concept should be seen in the broader con-
text of food systems. Within food systems there 
are activities – such as the production and pro-
cessing of food raw materials – and outcomes, 
such as e.g. food security. Food security incor-
porates three dimensions: 
 
1. Food availability; 
2. Food accessibility; 
3. Food utilisation (cf. Fig.1). 
 
 
Fig. 1: Food System Activities and Outcomes 
(Ingram 2011, p.421) 
 
Food availability is marked through the produc-
tion, distribution, and exchange of food prod-
ucts. The safety, and the nutritional and social 
value10 of food are parts of the food utilisation 
dimension. Food access is influenced by the 
purchasing power of the household and the 
relative affordability of food; the allocation of 
food products; and individuals’ preferences. 
“Food availability is necessary but not sufficient 
for access, and access is necessary but not 
                                                
10 The social value of food products is determined by so-
cial, political, and economic functions generated through 
the consumption of specific types of food. Ingram, J. 
(2011) A food systems approach to researching food 
security and its interactions with global environmental 
change. Food Security, 3, 417-431. 
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sufficient for utilization” (Webb et al. 2006, p. 
1405). This study focuses on food access. “Ac-
cess has been defined as a household’s ability 
to acquire enough food of sufficient quality to 
have all its members meet their nutritional re-
quirements and lead productive lives” 
(Labadarios et al. 2011, p. 891). While Ingram 
defines food access as outlined above, this 
study follows the related definition of the FAO, 
which is more suitable in an empirical study. 
According to the FAO (2014), food access could 
be divided into economic access, measured 
with the domestic food price index, physical 
access as an infrastructural component, and the 
prevalence of undernourishment. 
 
On the household level different access strate-
gies are used to attain food security. One strat-
egy to provide especially economic access in 
rural areas is cash-crop production in order to 
buy food. On the other side critics argue, from a 
perspective of food availability, that it is ques-
tionable to use scarce resources (e.g. land, 
irrigation water) for cash-crop production, in-
stead of using them for household food provi-
sion (Brigham 2011, Idalinya 2012). In this con-
text it is also generally discussable as to what 
extent cash-crop production is a possible strat-
egy for all farmers, or rather only for a capable 
minority while potential negative effects affect 
the broader community (e.g. reduction of water 
availability). 
 
Horticultural Farming in Kenya and the 
Mount Kenya region 
In the rural areas of Kenya, as in nearly every 
rural region of Sub-Saharan Africa, agriculture 
is the main contributor to a household’s liveli-
hood, and as a result has a vital impact on the 
food security of most households. Commercial 
horticulture in Kenya is seen as a possibility for 
generating income and reducing poverty of rural 
households (Muendo and Tschirley 2004). Fol-
lowing this, horticultural production is regarded 
as a chance to improve the food access of 
those households involved by raising their in-
comes (Afari-Sefa 2007). However, keeping in 
mind possible conflicts between food- and cash-
crop production, a deeper understanding of the 
food security situation and strategies of such 
farmers is needed. 
 
In the Mount Kenya region cash-crop produc-
tion is highly concentrated, and the region is 
known for a rapid growth of the horticultural 
export sector, mainly to countries in the Euro-
pean Union. Land holdings in the area – typical 
for Kenya – are generally less than 15 ha and 
managed by family ventures. Since the 1990s 
horticultural export production has become the 
most important form of income in the region. 
Export products are, above all, French beans, 
snow peas, avocados, and mangoes. In 2005, 
about 4000 horticultural farmers in the area 
were producing for export (Dannenberg 2011, 
Dannenberg and Nduru 2013). However, even 
in Mt. Kenya a lot of farmers do not produce for 
export and most export-oriented small-scale 
farmer households in the region follow a mixed 
strategy in producing cash-crops for the export 
and domestic market as well as food crops for 
own consumption (Muendo and Tschirley 
2004). To compare these different groups of 
farmers with different markets, incomes, and 
strategies and their influences on food accessi-
bility, this study includes farmer households 
who produce for the horticultural export market 
and those who sell their produce at the local 
markets. 
 
Data and Methodology 
The presented study is the outcome of a stu-
dent thesis based on an empirical study of six 
weeks in February and March 2015. Following 
our research questions, a mixed methods ap-
proach was used, consisting of 88 quantitative 
questionnaires completed by farmers, and 29 
qualitative interviews with farmers, extension 
officers, and employees at the Ministry of Agri-
culture, Livestock and Fisheries (MALF) and the 
Horticultural Crops Directorate (HCD)11. 
 
In this research design, access to food is the 
dependent variable, and is measured through 
components of the households’ economic and 
physical access, as well as the prevalence of 
undernourishment. The monthly income level of 
the household was used to operationalize the 
economic access (Webb et al. 2006). The dis-
tance to the nearest food market and the type of 
transport used were indicators for physical ac-
cess. Undernourishment was mainly captured 
by household data about the frequency of con-
sumption of grains, vegetables, fruits, dairy 
products, meat, and fish, as well as the number 
of meals consumed. Additionally, the proportion 
of the households’ total farming production de-
voted to food-crop production was also a meas-
ure for the dimension of prevalence of under-
nourishment (Masekoameng and Maliwichi 
2014). Food security or insecurity was captured 
                                                
11 A detailed description of the data collection process and 
the qualitative and quantitative analysis can be found in 
Pargen, L. (2015): Zugang zu Lebensmitteln von 
Kleinbauern in der Mount Kenya Region. Bachelor Thesis. 
University of Cologne. 
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through the occurrence of food shortages dur-
ing a year and the number of months character-
ized by food shortages (Coates, Swindale and 
Bilinsky 2007). 
 
The first step of the statistical analysis was to 
verify a relation between the variables of food 
security and the variables used to operational-
ize the different access dimensions. Subse-
quently, variables which could have an impact 
on the access dimensions were tested. Data 
from the qualitative interviews were used to 
identify influencing factors on the farmers’ food 
security and to interpret the quantitative results.  
 
Results and Discussion 
In total 19 farmers in our sample produced for 
local markets, 65 farmers produced for export 
and local markets, and four farmers produced 
only for export. All surveyed farmers also pro-
duced food crops for own consumption. This 
already suggests that it is important for small-
scale farmer households to achieve a certain 
balance between cash-crop production for in-
come-generating purposes, and food-crop pro-
duction for household consumption in order to 
have sufficient access to food. 
 
However, 44% of the 88 interviewed house-
holds were still affected by food shortages dur-
ing the year, and thus were classified as food 
insecure. Food shortages imply merely a re-
stricted access to higher-valued food products 
like meat, fruits, and vegetables. Basic food 
products like maize, rice, and milk are still 
available. A greater part (49% of 39) of the 
food-insecure households face food shortages 
during two months of the year. Strengthening 
the findings of KFSSG (2011), food insecurity 
viewed from the food-access angle is not a 
striking issue. Following this, food insecurity 
may not be a so much a problem of food acces-
sibility, but rather a question of food utilisation. 
 
Food short-
ages during a 
year 
Quantity Valid quantity 
yes 39 (44.3%) 45.9 % 
no 46 (52.3 %) 54.1 % 
 Missing          
3 (3.4 %) 
Total                   
100 % 
Fig. 1: Food shortages during a year 
 
Contradictory to FAO’s assumptions (2014), 
there was no relevant relationship found be-
tween the infrastructural variables of the physi-
cal access and the occurrence of food shortag-
es during a year. Our interviews indicated that 
this is due to the small nearby shops offering a 
basic stock of food products. Otherwise, both 
prevalence of undernourishment and economic 
access variables have an impact on house-
holds’ food security, as measured by food 
shortages during a year.  
Furthermore, our results showed no significant 
differences in food shortages between   the 
export-oriented farmers and the non-export-
oriented farmers. However, by taking a closer 
look at other related factors, significant differ-
ences appear. 
 
A relation was revealed between the proportion 
of farmland used for export cash-crop produc-
tion and the monthly income. This underlines 
the high economic value export production can 
have in relation to domestic market strategies 
(see also Afari-Sefa 2007, Dannenberg and 
Nduru 2015). 
 
A further link exists between the economic ac-
cess, measured by monthly income, and the 
occurrence of food shortages during a year. A 
higher monthly income of the household appar-
ently leads to better food access and therefore 
enables food security. Furthermore, a higher 
monthly income decreases the duration of food 
shortages. 
 
The proportion of farmland used for food crop 
production, a measure for the prevalence of 
undernourishment, has an influence on food 
access. Farmer households that allocate more 
than 10% for own consumption purposes are 
more likely to access enough food. Neverthe-
less, it is remarkable that households using 
more than 30 % of the farming land for food 
crop production have a tendency to be affected 
by food shortages, but this group of farmers is 
too small to exhibit a strong argument. This 
indicates that at a certain level the ratio of food 
production to cash-crop production (given the 
limited available land) becomes too high, and 
the outputs of cash-crop production become too 
small. Supporting Masekoameng and Maliwichi 
(2014) our study underlines that the combina-
tion of commercial income and food-crop pro-
duction can be an important and useful strategy 
to assure food security. 
 
The results further exhibit a relation between 
the gender of the farmer in charge and the oc-
currence of food shortages during a year. As 
other studies have already stated (Kassie, 
Ndiritu and Stage 2014, Ivers and Cullen 2011, 
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Mallick and Rafi 2010), if the farmer in charge 
or the head of household is male, the house-
hold is more likely to access enough food. Ac-
cording to the literature this gender effect can 
be explained as being due to male-headed 
households having greater access to resources 
like land, income, markets etc. However, this 
could not be verified by our data. 
 
A key factor for food security however is water: 
In the dry season farmers are in severe compe-
tition over water, especially for their irrigation. 
Confirming earlier studies (Falkenmark 2010, 
Besada and Werner 2015), 90% of those classi-
fied as food-insecure households stated that the 
dry season and the associated scarcity of water 
induced food shortages. Investments of the 
government and non-governmental organiza-
tions are already targeting these issues. 
 
As mentioned above, it can be problematic to 
use scarce resources for cash-crop production 
instead of food-crop production. Hence, a re-
placement of traditional food crops through 
cash crops for income generation could pose a 
problem for food security in the Mount Kenya 
region in general. Indeed, our results show that 
the proportion of land used for export cash-crop 
production has a negative impact on the propor-
tion used for food-crop production. However, 
the proportion of land used for export produc-
tion is negatively influencing the proportion of 
land used for local cash-crop production to a 
greater degree. Thus, producing cash crops for 
the export market is more at the cost of land 
otherwise used for cash-crop production for the 
local market than it is at the cost of the propor-
tion of farmland providing crops for own con-
sumption. Hence, farmer households are able 
to produce both cash crops for the export mar-
ket and food crops for own consumption pur-
poses. In this way a mixed strategy – which in 
the literature is discussed as being challenging 
(e.g. Brigham 2011) – is possible. 
 
From an individual farmer’s perspective this 
means that export-oriented cash-crop produc-
tion can be a useful strategy to gain income and 
achieve economic food accessibility without 
reducing one’s own food production and availa-
bility. (For broader political development strate-
gies the decision-making process is more com-
plex, as e.g. different capabilities of farmers and 
related problems of unequal distribution of 
wealth and potential external negative effects 
have to be taken into account). 
 
Conclusion 
In sum, food insecurity among horticultural 
small-scale farmer households in the Mount 
Kenya region is not severe; at the most it is a 
temporary issue influenced by water scarcity. 
However, the food security of the analysed 
farmers is affected through the economic ac-
cess dimension. A higher monthly income con-
tributes to a better food access situation in 
those households. A larger proportion of the 
farming land being used for food crops increas-
es the households’ food access, yet only up to a 
certain threshold. Households with a male per-
son in charge of the farming business, and suf-
ficient access to water for irrigation, are better 
off in the dimension of food access and there-
fore food secure. 
 
Our results underline that a mixed strategy, 
which includes food and cash crops in this con-
text, can be a reasonable approach to achieve 
a relatively high level of food security. While 
generally it can be challenging for farmers to 
find the right balance between food and cash 
crops, the strategy of moving from local com-
mercial food production to the high-value export 
production without eliminating food-crop pro-
duction has turned out to be practicable so far. 
For farmers, mixed production of cash crops 
and food crops can be a possible strategy to 
ensure economic access and reduce the preva-
lence of undernourishment to reach food securi-
ty. This indicates that a balanced integration of 
small-scale farming households into global 
markets may offer a good chance for farmers to 
achieve food security. As a result, such mixed 
strategies should be considered as options for 
achieving food security in similar agricultural 
production systems in Africa and the Global 
South. Policy-makers should however also keep 
in mind the specific capabilities of the farmers 
involved, and consider that often not all farmers 
are capable of following such strategies. 
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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TERROR 
IN EUROPE 
 
By Giorgos Poulimenakos and Dimitris 
Dalakolgou (VU Amsterdam) 
 
Footage that shows the Abdeslam brothers 
having fun in a nightclub in Brussels, even after 
their so-called radicalization, came as a bit of a 
shock to many. In the images, the men now 
known to be terrorists were smoking, drinking, 
and dancing; they were using the same body 
language and slang to the other people in the 
club. They did not look like were following 
different than usual norms, but on the contrary 
they were behaving more or less as one may 
expect from young males of Northern Europe to 
behave in such situation. 
 
Generally, sociological and anthropological 
research often shows that in European 
countries fewer and fewer second-generation 
Muslim immigrants pay attention to religion, let 
alone political Islam. What one sees in daily life 
amongst second and third generation male 
migrants in North Europe is self-expressions 
that prioritize different things than religion. If 
one was to observe ethnographically some 
examples, self-expressions through urban pop 
subcultures, the pursuit of material goals 
including consumer goods like fast cars etc. 
seem much more common than religion. 
 
The majority of the analyses that appeared in 
media and social media discourses after the 
two recent attacks have not failed to reproduce 
the motifs that emerged after 9/11. On the one 
hand, there is the ultra-conservative 
Islamophobic discourse that argues that there 
exists an intrinsic, ontological violence inherent 
in Islamic scripts and values, and therefore that 
the Muslim population poses a continual 
historical threat to the Western world. 
 
On the other hand, there is the leftist-oriented 
interpretation of the phenomenon of Islamic 
terrorism, which traces the origins of brutality to 
the consequences of historical Western 
imperialism in the ‘Orient’. Many centuries of 
Euro-American interventions has often forcibly 
altered the economic, political, and social 
realities of peoples all around the world, 
according to Western geopolitical interests. 
From the Syces-Picot agreement, to the role 
played by the USA in the formation and 
strengthening of militant organizations of 
political Islam, these approaches expose the 
dark historical processes that ensured Western 
global domination at the cost of the well-being 
of other populations. Thus, these more leftist 
opinions call for the blame to be placed on the 
geopolitics of capitalism, and not on a religion 
or a specific group of people. 
 
The first argument, the conservative one, 
remains very popular; nevertheless it has been 
already criticized heavily, and rightly, and to this 
we do not have much to add. In this brief text 
we wish to focus a bit more on the latter 
argument and to examine some of its own 
logical discontinuities.  
 
This second, progressive line of thinking 
explains a source of monstrosity that ‘we’ (the 
West) created ‘out there’, which has now begun 
to invade ‘here’ – rather like the ancient Greek 
myth of Nemesis. But what if our Nemesis 
appears in a more familiar guise? 
 
One perhaps should start their inquiry by 
wondering what collective subjectivities are 
produced amongst European youth when they 
witness, and are invited to remain indifferent to, 
the mass deaths of migrants and refugees 
along the European borders?  According to the 
Greek Minister of Migration, his Belgian 
colleague Theo Francken told him: ‘you must 
consider letting them drown’ as his official 
position on the refugee crisis. The Belgian 
government denied the statement; however, it 
remains a fact that this has been the European 
governments’ collective attitude towards 
refugees for some time now. Might not the word 
nihilism be an appropriate term to describe such 
attitude?   
 
Before fear become a norm in the European 
capitals because of the consecutive attacks, 
there was another condition producing fear for 
substantial parts of the European population – 
that is, for the working poor, those occupied in 
precarious or undocumented labour, 
subcontracted labour, and in general those who 
are victims, or remain continually potential 
victims, of the flexible labour market. It might 
not seem a proximate reality (at least until now) 
for middle-class white college educated 
Europeans, but this is precisely the reality for 
many second-generation migrants in countries 
like the Netherlands, France, Belgium, and the 
UK. A brief visit to blue-collar workplaces like 
factories, logistics warehouses etc. – those 
industries that keep everything moving 
smoothly in European metropolises – would be 
enough to make this phenomenon apparent. 
A British Imam, giving his opinion about what 
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draws young people to radical Islam for a TV 
show, stated recently: ‘I believe that European 
societies are not giving ways out to young 
people anymore. For example, here in order to 
play tennis you have to pay five pounds. You 
have to pay to do anything.’ Everyone who has 
lived in the UK has heard the typical joke: ‘every 
breath you take costs you one quid in London’. 
During the post-1990s era, the hegemonic 
discourse in Europe was claiming that social 
class inequality is a myth that does not apply in 
contemporary World. The mantra of 
depoliticization of everyday life, and the erasure 
of visible social contradictions was repeated by 
intellectuals, journalists, politicians etc. 
Unlimited growth of an economy where 
everyone would be benefited via increase of the 
consumption were promised and there was 
space supposedly for everyone in that 
European Dream. However, this did not happen 
and since there is no political-economic 
antagonism, it is nobody's fault, this is how it is, 
some people will be excluded from the party. 
But maybe if we teach people that there is not 
such a thing as social class or class 
antagonism, and that such ideas do not explain 
social asymmetries in contemporary society, it 
follows that there is no one to blame for poverty 
and inequality. However, if there is nobody to 
blame does not follow that everyone is to 
blame? 
 
This is not to say that the religious factor is of 
absolutely no importance. However, living 
between a very politicized European country 
where axes of reference are political (Greece), 
and northern Europe ( Netherlands and UK) 
where politicized explanations of the world are 
almost invisible among the younger 
generations, we are examining the possibility 
that the pain we are facing in northern Europe 
has little to do with what is happening ‘out 
there’. Perhaps religion is being used as an a 
posteriori explanation of a phenomenon that 
actually has its roots in modern secular 
European culture.  
 
At the end of the story might it be that this kind 
of twisted radicalization is not the product of a 
failure of integration of migrants into the 
European setting, but the opposite? Such 
attitudes might rather be indicative of a deep 
assimilation to the unethical ethos of the 
neoliberal Europe of the 1990s-2000s. Is it too 
extreme to say that the creation of these 
nihilistic subjectivities that spread terror in Paris 
and Brussels are compatible with – if not a 
consequence of – the neoliberal systemic shift 
of Western capitalist societies? 
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SURVIVAL IN POST-MINING 
COMMUNITIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: 
WOMEN AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN 
LESOTHO 
By Sean Maliehe (Post-doctoral fellow in the 
Human Economy Programme, University of 
Pretoria) 
Background 
The world’s dominant economic rationality, 
homo economicus, is narrow and individualistic. 
It has benefited those with money while 
marginalising those without. It has cultivated 
staggering inequality, violent oppression of the 
majority of the people, and the suppression of 
their human rights, most profoundly in the 
Global South. The trickle-down benefits have 
never reached the majority of the people, but 
the rich have become richer and richer. 
Emphasis on GDP increase and growth has 
been nothing but an illusion of hope to 
legitimise the neglect and marginalisation of the 
masses. The scientific and computational 
economic approaches used by experts, 
particularly economists, have divorced the study 
of the economy from the rest of the people. It is 
time to reclaim and release the economy to the 
people, both theoretically and practically 
speaking. This involves expanding our 
knowledge and methods of studying what the 
people do for themselves.12 The exercise also 
involves critically examining the dominant post-
WWII economic development model that sought 
to standardise world societies according to the 
image of the West. Communities in the Global 
South were shepherded to fit into a mould 
created in the West – modernity in its different 
shades. Those that never fitted were vilified and 
treated as uncivilised, while the Westernised 
moulding attempts never stopped.  
 
The Human Economy programme is a research 
group based at the University of Pretoria, South 
Africa, which I joined in 2012 as a PhD student. 
We are an interdisciplinary programme devoted 
to studying what the people do to help 
themselves in the economy, and how what they 
do can be amplified for the rest for the world. 
We believe that people are not passive in the 
economy. They are active actors with a certain 
sense of agency that might not necessarily fit 
with the economic mainstream.13 The history of 
                                                
12  Keith Hart and John Sharp, People, Money and Power 
in the Economic Crisis: Perspectives from the Global 
South (Oxford: Berghahn, 2015).   
13  Keith Hart, Jean-Louis Laville and Antonio David 
Cattani, “Building the Human Economy Together” in 
women in Lesotho’s business in the context of 
the decline of the southern African regional 
mining complex is pregnant with a myriad 
lessons. Their entrepreneurial pursuits of credit-
rotating schemes (stokvels), cooperatives, and 
associations, and their often-deemed ‘unortho-
dox’ informal-to-formal routes make the plurality 
of economies and economic motives more ap-
parent. Beyond the market economy rationality 
(homo economicus), they demonstrate mutuali-
ty, solidarity, trust, loyalty, and other obscured 
economic motives. These principles can be 
important for creating more inclusive economic 
models in the Global South.   
 
The discovery of minerals in South Africa in the 
nineteenth century changed the history of the 
African indigenous people, and the region as a 
whole. By colonial design, southern African 
indigenous communities emerged as suppliers 
of labour to South African mines and industries. 
As a result, since then, almost 75% of rural 
households depended on remittances in 
Lesotho. In popular southern African 
historiography the country is referred to as a 
‘labour reserve’. However, little is known about 
economic activities that the Basotho, the people 
of Lesotho – particularly the indigenous people 
– engaged in for survival within the country and 
how they linked this emergent regional 
economic space with domestic survival activity. 
Apart from agriculture and informal business, 
commerce (retailing and wholesaling) was the 
main economic activity. Even more marginal in 
the economy were, and still are, the women 
entrepreneurs. Their activities are significant 
because when men left to go and work in South 
Africa, they had to take care of the household. 
Instead of resisting this, they took advantage of 
what the domestic economy had to offer. For 
their part, they emerged as economic frontier 
explorers of the country, albeit obscured due to 
patriarchy.  
 
Remittances were never reliably adequate for 
the survival of the household back home. 
Worse, there were widespread cases of makho-
loa. These were men who left their families and 
married new wives in South Africa, or squan-
dered their money in promiscuity abroad. Some 
came back after years while others never did. 
Some men supported multiple families. These 
stories are familiar to us and were commonly 
heard as we grew up. My own father was a 
                                                                             
Keith Hart, Jean-Louis Laville and Antonio David 
Cattani (eds), The Human Economy: A Citizen’s Guide 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010). 
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miner at one point, having taken over his fa-
ther’s position after his death in 1975. Back 
home, women had to find alternative means of 
survival. A lot of women found economic refuge 
in the informal economy, which allowed them 
easier access. They sold traditionally brewed 
beer, food, fruits, vegetables, handicrafts and 
other items. Many women started making signif-
icant inroads into the formal business after the 
1950s onwards.   
 
Basotho women’s entrepreneurial efforts and 
emergent economic solidarity has become far 
too important a force to ignore, especially since 
the 1990s, as the southern African mining 
economic complex started to show clearer signs 
of decline. Many indigenous groups were 
retrenched while employment opportunities 
closed up for the men. Remittances that 
supported households dried up immediately. 
The result was twofold; on the one hand, 
poverty and inequality increased. On the other, 
this forced the Basotho to find alternative 
economic means of survival. Many retrenched 
miners invested their gratuities in property (lo-
cally known as malaene), transport businesses, 
retail business, agro-business, and other enter-
prises, to support their families. As men came 
back, the economic dynamics had shifted 
dramatically, and women were far ahead of the 
game (and they are getting stronger every day).  
 
This change has also altered the traditional 
patriarchal nature of gender roles and relations 
that had previously marginalised and left 
women with no meaningful economic say or 
participation. They use money and markets to 
transform their traditional space of the ‘kitchen’, 
which housed groceries, pigs, and chickens. To 
the rest of the people, their businesses in the 
form of grocery stores, poultry, restaurants, 
sheebens, piggery, etc. were immediately 
identifiable with the space patriarchy accorded 
them. This became a recipe that silently and 
non-aggressively changed gender roles and 
relations. The story of women in Lesotho’s 
economy gives us an opportunity to draw some 
lessons that may assist economies in the 
current regional and global economic crisis.       
 
Women in Colonial Commerce 
The story of women in local business falls within 
the history of indigenously-owned business. 
However, their involvement in local business as 
enterprise owners dates back to the 1940s and 
1950s. Women in colonial commerce were in 
the periphery of the periphery. Commerce – 
retailing and wholesaling – was the dominant 
form of business.  It was monopolised by Euro-
pean traders that mostly arrived in the late nine-
teenth century after Lesotho became a British 
Protectorate in 1868. Through the European-
only Basutoland Chamber of Commerce, they 
collaborated with the colonial government to 
exclude and marginalise Basotho and Indian 
traders. It was not until 1906 that the first Moso-
tho opened a business. However, Basotho’s 
licences restricted them from operating in the 
town centres. The colonial government strategi-
cally placed them in remote rural and moun-
tainous areas that lacked infrastructure (espe-
cially roads and bridges) and adequate custom-
ers. 
 
Until the 1920s, there were less than 10 Baso-
tho licence holders; all men. Due to the reces-
sion of the 1920s and 1930s, their businesses 
collapsed. The Basotho pressured the colonial 
government through their political and business 
associations. The most prominent were the Ba-
sutoland Progressive Association, the League 
of Commoners, and the Basuto Traders’ Asso-
ciations, which had been formed in 1907, 1919, 
and 1940 respectively. As a result, a significant 
increase in the number of Basotho traders oc-
curred after 1951, following the government’s 
announcement of Proclamation No. 72. The 
Proclamation provided for what was called a 
Basuto Restricted Traders Licence, which was 
specifically intended for Basotho. The number 
of businesses owned by Basotho increased 
from three in 1935 to about 2,700 in 1958.14 
 
It was only after 1951 that a larger number of 
women were able to open businesses of their 
own. According to colonial laws, traders’ licence 
applicants had to be taxpayers. Basotho women 
were not recognised as such by the Native Tax 
Proclamation No. 3 of 1911, which enforced 
and regulated the payment of tax.15 The new 
law exempted them from the tax prerequisite, 
on condition that their husbands or fathers were 
taxpayers. From 1951, a number of Basotho 
women were issued with trading licences. Even 
though the colonial laws permitted them to ap-
ply for such licences, available information sug-
gests that only very few Basotho women owned 
and ran such stores prior to independence. 
Nonetheless, for the largely marginal Basotho 
women, this was a major breakthrough. Essen-
tially, 1951 was a significant year for Basotho in 
business, and even more importantly for wom-
en.  
                                                
14 Basutoland Colonial Annual Reports, 1958, p. 45. 
15 Basutoland Proclamations and Notices, 1911. 
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How they made it 
After independence, the number of indigenous-
ly-owned businesses increased further, and so 
did the numbers of women in business. Statisti-
cally speaking, they presently constitute almost 
80% of Lesotho’s local business. Many women 
started from the informal economy and worked 
their way into formal businesses. Others used 
remittances to start their businesses. In some 
cases, businesses were started by both part-
ners. In this scenario, the husband would be 
employed in South Africa, or even locally, as a 
teacher or civil servant. The wife would then 
manage the business on a daily basis. Though 
there are some men who started their busi-
nesses from the informal economy, this has 
predominately been a women’s route.  
 
Women have acquired various derogatory 
names, including bo ’mathoto and bo ’m’e ba-
seterateng, literally, ‘luggage women’ and 
‘street women’, respectively. Alicia Motšoane is 
a single mother who owns and manages two 
medium-sized businesses: a furniture shop 
(Prestige Furniture, which has branches in three 
districts of Lesotho), and a funeral parlour (Sen-
tebale Gap Funeral Services) with two branches 
in the country, one in Mafeteng and the other in 
the Berea district. In 1993, she started stocking 
clothes and blankets from South Africa, where 
she bought them at cheaper wholesale prices to 
resell in Lesotho.16 She started selling her mer-
chandise at the time when she was working as 
a secretary for a law firm in Maseru. In our in-
terview, she said: 
 
I started my business where every typical Mo-
sotho woman starts. This is where we start off 
as hawkers. Well, I would go to the Republic of 
South Africa to get merchandise, which I would 
later sell to other Basotho . . . on part-time basis 
because by then I was permanently employed. I 
used to do my business during lunch break. 
 
Some women moved from the informal sector 
into the formal sector by entering into various 
credit arrangements with more European trad-
ers who were able to start them off. Of course, 
this was widespread and not limited only to 
women. Though such arrangements aided 
some indigenous entrepreneurs in starting off, 
such deals also reproduced the monopoly of the 
Europeans. As a result, some Basotho resorted 
to the alternative of importing stock from South 
                                                
16 Interview with Alicia Motšoane, Mafeteng, October, 
2013.  
 
Africa. ’Mamatheala Shale was a business 
woman in her late 60s when I interviewed her. 
She started her businesses from her tailoring 
background. Before she passed away in 2013, 
a month after the interview, she owned and 
managed a number of businesses, namely a 
petrol filling station, a business complex which 
she rented out to other business people, a retail 
store, and a tailoring company.  
 
Shale got into business in 1973 after she com-
pleted a diploma in clothing design in England. 
However, when she returned to Lesotho, she 
could not get a job. She started designing and 
repairing people’s clothes informally, working 
from her home. With her savings, she then 
rented a business premises and started a retail 
and restaurant business. She approached Fra-
sers’ wholesale branch in Maseru and success-
fully negotiated with its manager to give her 
stock on credit to start. However, gradually, she 
realised that the arrangement hindered her from 
making significant profits. As a result, she start-
ed buying her stock in South Africa. It was after 
importing stock from outside the country that 
she was able to realise better returns. Shale 
recollected that:  
 
When I started, it wasn’t easy. [’Mampolokeng, 
a friend] introduced me to Frasers wholesalers 
whom she was dealing with and I got supplies 
from Frasers to build my business. The deal I 
had with Frasers was pulling me back ... I start-
ed buying supplies in Bloemfontein from such 
wholesalers as Metro, Trailer and so on. That 
helped me a lot. 
 
By far, women in Lesotho have also been 
known to use collective credit-rotating schemes 
such as stokvels to start and support their busi-
nesses. They are locally known as mekholisano 
or mpate-sheleng (though the latter is more 
specific to burial societies). Though some men 
have increasingly become part of such credit 
schemes, they have largely been known and 
referred to as a ‘women’s thing’ – ntho-ea-
basali. ’Mamahlapane Rakuoane, President and 
founding member of the Women’s Federation in 
Lesotho, testified that: 
 
We made clusters of businesses; meaning 
some owned pigs, some greenhouses, some 
fabrics, and so on . . . we started by forming 
stokvels . . . Our stokvels work this way; we 
contribute money and divide ourselves in 
groups according to our capabilities, and some 
contribute R1,500 every month, others R15,000 
. . . some contribute R200, some R500, R100, 
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some even R50. We accommodate everybody. 
Some cannot even afford R30 monthly but [may 
have] a site where we can rear chickens. So, 
we put that site on the plate while others put 
money. [Then] . . . we give to one person to 
start or [expand] their business. [And on a 
monthly basis] we go to [one member’s place 
where] she is supposed to have cooked food [to 
feed members of the stokvel at the day’s gath-
ering] and each of us is expected to pay R300 . 
. . We give her the money. 
 
During my fieldwork in 2013, the Federation 
appeared to be the most vibrant and popular 
association with broad membership around the 
country. Its inclusive approach helped it to draw 
wider membership. On top of that, its economic 
strategy, anchored in stokvels, has been effec-
tive in helping many women to start and expand 
their businesses. There were also a number of 
other women-only business associations that 
had erupted in recent years, such as Women in 
Small Businesses, the Exporters Association of 
Lesotho, and others. Members of these associ-
ations were conscious of the fact that they con-
stituted a majority in business as well as in oth-
er big business associations like the Lesotho 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Mohloli 
Business Chamber and Private Sector Founda-
tion of Lesotho, but the leadership of these con-
tinues to be dominated by men – a patriarchal 
heritage.      
 
Hopes and Reflections  
Economic aspirations are typically pregnant 
with hopes for better outcomes than current 
circumstances can offer. The majority of the 
people in the Global South struggle to realise 
such a futurist ambition. People on the ground 
may be aware of their immediate conditions, but 
not of the economic reality beyond their reach. 
Neither capitalism nor communism has been 
able to deliver better outcomes for them. In-
stead, there has been ever-increasing inequality 
and poverty. The story of women in Lesotho 
demonstrates that they did not remain submis-
sive and passive in the economy. They organ-
ised themselves through associations, coopera-
tives, and rotating-credit schemes. This is one 
of our missions in the Human Economy Pro-
gramme – to study and make sense of what 
people do for themselves, with the bigger mis-
sion to examine how such approaches can help 
in the creation of a more inclusive society where 
the majority of the people have a meaningful 
say and participation in economic matters that 
affect their lives. One can tease out more spe-
cific and salient lessons that can be drawn from 
the economic history of the Basotho women 
entrepreneurs. For one, they make the reality of 
economic pluralism apparent. Beyond rational 
economic motivations, their activities are em-
bedded in solidarity, trust, mutuality, and loyalty. 
Of course, these are volatile motives that can-
not be taken at face value, but they expand our 
understanding of economic motives. These 
principles emphasise a far more inclusive eco-
nomic arrangement and philosophy than ne-
oliberalism currently offers. They also substan-
tiate the fact that there are alternatives to major 
ideologies of production (capitalism and social-
ism) that are not resistant to money and mar-
kets.                
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COMPREHENDING INDUSTRIALIZATION: 
FROM ABSTRACT TO HUMAN 
 
By Mallika Shakya (South Asian University) 
 
 
Those who have followed the past several dec-
ades of economic discourses around the world, 
and especially in the Global South, will note that 
an economy is increasingly expressed in terms 
of rationality or profit-motive transaction while 
ignoring other facets having to do with reciproci-
ty and redistribution. Methodologically speaking, 
information about economies is increasingly 
considered and communicated in abstract units 
of numeric values and forms of mathematical 
equations, while real-life histories and social 
trajectories are often set aside as “anecdotes”. 
Abstractism is a double offender: On the one 
hand, neoliberal experimenters use it to further 
the ideology of market supremacy while consid-
ering that economy stands on the equilibrium 
between the two anonymous forces of demand 
and supply. On the other hand, the Marxist dis-
course fetishizes class by interpreting it strictly 
in terms of income or occupation for exercises 
of central economic planning. The casualties 
here are the humanizing tenets of economic 
transactions and activities, of understanding 
how human beings insert themselves into the 
economies they are situated in. 
 
In conceptualizing what a “human economy” 
might mean, Keith Hart, Jean-Louis Laville and 
David Cattani (2010) have argued for the fulfil-
ment of four criteria: (i) it should be made and 
remade by people and should be of practical 
use to us all in our daily lives; (ii) it should ad-
dress a great variety of particular situations in 
all their institutional complexity; (iii) it must be 
based on a more holistic conception of every-
one’s needs and interests; (iv) it has to address 
humanity as a whole and the world society we 
are in. I discuss the unfolding of various eco-
nomic and political turbulences in Nepal to ex-
amine whether and how such concerns are be-
ing resonated in this Third-World country situat-
ed between the giants of China and India. 
 
Nepal is a country never directly colonized, but 
sufficiently colonially influenced to make a case 
for what Michael Herzfeld (2002) called “crypto-
colonialism”. Many scholars have argued that 
feudalism was replaced in Nepal by colonial 
capitalism when it was conceded one third of its 
territory to the British empire following a defeat 
in 1815. Later, when the British rule ended in 
South Asia, Nepal did oust the dictatorial Rana 
regime that came to rule it through implicit Brit-
ish support. The tragedy for Nepal was that its 
stint with postcolonial democracy lasted less 
than a decade and it fell into the hands of the 
mono-ethnic Hindu Shah kings in the 1960s. 
What this meant for the Nepali economy was 
that the new Hindu king hijacked the global dis-
course on economic modernization and democ-
racy to build a state that was mono-ethnic and 
mono-religious in nature. King Mahendra justi-
fied his coup against democracy to launch a 
regime called Panchayat, which pursued an 
anonymized idiom of developmental when in 
reality it worked to build an elite class from a 
select few caste and ethnic groups under the 
patronage of a Hindu state (Shakya, 2013a). 
 
The Hindu monarchy was brought to the consti-
tutional limits in Nepal at the end of the cold war 
– an era Francis Fukuyama (1995) heralded as 
“the end of history”, which supposedly signified 
a global triumph of capitalism over its com-
munist rival. For Nepal, the 1990 regime 
change meant a direct march toward a market-
based economy from a state-protected econo-
my through a cascaded trajectory of bureaucrat-
ic and industrial reforms. An ethnographic case 
study of the readymade garment industry in 
Nepal showed that “democratization”, for the 
world of businessmen and workers, largely 
meant deregulation of firms, including removal 
of entry and exit barriers into the market, and an 
opening up of business associations for mem-
bership of general public (see Shakya, 2004). 
 
Neoliberalism was somewhat reversed in Nepal 
when the country hit an industrial crisis at the 
turn of the century, at a time when a civil war 
being waged by Nepali Maoists in the country-
side calling for an end of monarchy began to 
seep into the cities. Especially in turbulent in-
dustries that witnessed large-scale retrench-
ment of labour and capital, there emerged new 
social movements that called for a “humanizing” 
drive, in terms of addressing humanitarian con-
cerns of wealth and poverty as well as in calling 
for a methodological departure from both neo-
classical and neo-Marxist economics, to 
acknowledge the role of individual actors and 
social institutions in the charting of the econom-
ic trajectories. I will discuss these two aspects 
of humanizing in the following paragraphs. 
 
With reference to the first, there emerged a re-
politicization of labour on and beyond the indus-
trial shop floors, which called on the govern-
ment to reverse the flexibilization of labour to 
humanize work to a certain degree (Shakya, 
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2016). The new union movement that emerged 
on the turbulent shop floors in Nepal just after 
2000 must be differentiated from the union 
movement of the past on one specific count: the 
new did not limit itself to concerns over wage 
and working conditions alone, but worked to-
wards achieving a broader social justice. Class 
formation did not happen on the isolated shop 
floors, but it drew on the broader socialization 
patterns in the world of workers that wove 
through overlapping structures of caste, ethnici-
ty, regionality, religion, and gender. The class 
positions of factory workers took on meanings 
when posited within the broader domains of 
social and cultural configurations. Class re-
sistance then gained life not from the narrow 
concerns of class interests but from broader 
concerns of social justice. This way of linking 
shop floors with the national ideological ethos is 
a phenomenon Karl von Holdt (2002) called 
“social movement unionization”, referring in his 
case to South Africa, a term that also seems 
applicable to Nepal as well as several other 
countries in the Global South. 
 
As for the second aspect of the humanizing 
drive, we see somewhat greater acknowledge-
ment of the fact that economic transactions 
were not exclusively rooted in profit-seeking 
motives, but that they drew on the broader so-
cial networks, institutions, and value systems. 
To take an example of the readymade garment 
industry connecting Nepal and the United 
States through a global supply chain, it is clari-
fied that markets are not constructed strictly 
from the anonymous forces of demand and 
supply, but through several complex sets of 
bilateral and multilateral trade agreements 
(Shakya, 2011a; Shakya, 2013b). As far as the 
efforts of the Nepali garment manufacturers are 
concerned, most exporters seemed to compete 
for their market share on counts of fashion and 
creativity often interpreted through culturally 
and locally nuanced guidelines of contemporary 
and cosmopolitan craft. In this sense, main-
stream economics’ claim about price- and quali-
ty-based competitiveness is inadequate, and we 
have to draw on the notions of consumer aes-
thetics through individualized interpretations of 
fashion and design (Shakya, 2011b). 
 
Here, by looking at how modern factory work-
ers, craftsmen, and capitalists have inserted 
themselves into Nepal’s industrial landscape, I 
have suggested that economic actors’ methods 
of social organization help them to build new 
alliances among themselves, but that these 
then also shed light on how their shop-floor ac-
tivities are situated within the lives and worlds 
that certainly extend beyond the limits of profit. 
Considering these questions may help us find a 
more human idiom through which to make 
sense of the process by which economies 
transform, thereby diluting the abstractness of 
the discourse on transformative trajectories. 
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PHILANTHROPY AS SALVATION: CAN 
THE RICH SAVE THE WORLD AND 
SHOULD WE LET THEM TRY? 
By Jessica Sklair (PhD Candidate, Anthropolo-
gy Department, Goldsmiths College, University 
of London) 
 
The title of this text is adapted – in an act of 
gentle sabotage – from that of a book by Mat-
thew Bishop and Michael Green (2008). The 
original is called Philanthrocapitalism: How the 
rich can save the world and why we should let 
them, and reads as a jubilant ode to contempo-
rary philanthropy among the global economic 
elite. Today’s philanthropists, argue the authors, 
have mastered the art of applying the best 
strategies and skills that business has to offer 
(as well as lots of money), to the world’s most 
pressing social problems, and are perhaps our 
best hope for social and environmental salva-
tion. Unsurprisingly, this argument and earlier 
versions of it have met with some criticism. Au-
thors such as Edwards (2010), Roelofs (2003) 
and Zizek (2006) have noted, with varying lev-
els of outrage, that the philanthropy of the 
wealthy looks suspiciously like a cover for the 
perpetuation of global inequalities under busi-
ness (or capitalism) as usual, and that the logic 
of the market is not simply transferrable to the 
third sector, not least because the former de-
pends on structural systems of inequality that 
the latter traditionally seeks to challenge. 
 
The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, undis-
puted leader in the landscape of contemporary 
elite philanthropy, has attracted particular scru-
tiny from commentators. Its staggering financial 
resources – according to its website, the Foun-
dation’s endowment is currently worth over 
US$41 billion, and it has already made grants 
totalling more than US$34 billion – have ena-
bled the Gates Foundation to devise an impres-
sive programme of global health initiatives. The 
scale of its resources, however, has seen the 
Foundation rewrite the international agenda on 
which issues and regions of the world receive 
the most funding for health, resulting in a skew 
towards areas like malaria and HIV/AIDS and 
away from those such as nutrition, child and 
maternal health, and chronic diseases, which 
most affect those living in poverty. Furthermore, 
the Gates Foundation answers to no-one in its 
decision-making, and there is little incentive for 
improvement in its transparency and accounta-
bility (Beckett 2010; Lancet 2009; McGoey 
2015). 
 
These parallel issues, of elite philanthropy’s 
lack of accountability and the (typical if not ex-
clusive) faith of its proponents in market-based 
ideology as the panacea for all the world’s prob-
lems, are the central concerns of those who 
question philanthropy’s potential for driving real 
social, ecological, and economic change. Dur-
ing my own anthropological research amongst 
wealthy philanthropists in São Paulo (Brazil’s 
largest urban centre), I had much opportunity to 
investigate these issues, and to discuss them 
with philanthropists themselves, the profession-
als who work with them, and their critics.  
 
In São Paulo, however, I also encountered a 
small group of young elite philanthropists whose 
attempt to engage with Brazil’s economic and 
social problems threw up a rather different set 
of issues. This took the form of a programme 
designed to create social change by encourag-
ing young wealthy elites to explore the issue of 
inequality in Brazil, and to better understand 
their own role and that of their families in its 
perpetuation. Through a process of awareness-
building, the programme aimed to encourage 
these young elites to adopt attitudes of social 
responsibility, and to commit time and money to 
philanthropic and other socially minded activi-
ties.  
 
This programme was part of a wider trend in 
‘donor education’ and philanthropy advisory 
services currently popular among global elites 
from the USA to the UK, Brazil, and beyond. 
The focus of this particular programme on the 
issues of social and economic inequality, how-
ever, and the direct objective of challenging 
young elites to place themselves within a wider 
picture of the historical and contemporary per-
petuation of these inequalities in Brazil, was 
unusual. It provided an interesting opportunity 
to enter into one of many elite Brazilian com-
munities and observe close-up the ambiguities 
and complexities surrounding attempts to 
change the world via philanthropy. It also pre-
sented a conceptual challenge for a researcher 
politically inclined to agree with the critics of 
philanthrocapitalism mentioned above, as 
something more politically nuanced and com-
plex appeared to be going on here than in many 
of the other philanthropic projects I had encoun-
tered.  
 
The creators of this programme were two young 
women from wealthy São Paulo families. Unlike 
many of their peers, both had eschewed ca-
reers in business, finance, or law in favour of a 
commitment to working in the third sector in the 
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pursuit of social change. The programme, de-
signed for members of the Brazilian economic 
elite (inheritors or self-made) aged between 25 
and 40, took place over a series of residential 
weekend seminars during the course of a year. 
It focused on the personal development of par-
ticipants, and on the belief that social transfor-
mation begins with changes in individual per-
ception and self-awareness. The programme’s 
coordinators aimed to broaden participants’ 
understanding of the causes of social and eco-
nomic inequality in Brazil and of the develop-
ment and current activities of the third sector, 
and to explore the role of philanthropy, CSR 
(corporate social responsibility), and other 
forms of elite social action within this landscape. 
These themes were explored through meetings 
with third-sector, philanthropy, and CSR profes-
sionals, site visits to third-sector organisations, 
readings, group discussions, artistic activities, 
and ‘self-awareness exercises’ 
 
 
While the programme encouraged participants 
to increase their philanthropy and to practice it 
in different ways, this was only one of a much 
wider range of possible outcomes that the pro-
gramme’s coordinators imagined for its partici-
pants. A significant outcome might be a partici-
pant using his or her influence on the board of 
their family business to introduce fairer or more 
sustainable business practices to the company, 
or leaving a job in finance to work in the third 
sector. But small changes in participants’ eve-
ryday behaviour, such as the cultivation of more 
responsible consumption patterns (e.g. deciding 
against the purchase of a second – or third or 
fourth – car) or paying domestic workers a 
higher wage, were considered equally important 
outcomes of the programme. 
 
During my research, however, I soon discov-
ered that while these dual objectives of the pro-
gramme – the raising of awareness of partici-
pants concerning inequality and their own role 
in perpetuating it, and behavioural change in 
accordance with this raised consciousness – 
were clearly defined in theory, they often ap-
peared to be difficult to achieve in practice. This 
difficulty was the subject of much discussion 
and anxiety amongst the programme’s coordi-
nators, particularly on the part of Paula (not her 
real name), a consultant hired to help design 
and facilitate the programme.  
 
Unlike the founders and other coordinators of 
the programme, Paula did not come from an 
elite background. She worked for an NGO that 
provided advisory services to a wide range of 
other third-sector organisations, from grassroots 
social movements to CSR initiatives, and she 
brought a highly critical perspective on Brazil’s 
elite philanthropy sector to her role. In an inter-
view with me she outlined this perspective 
(which she emphasised was her personal view 
and not necessarily representative of the views 
of the programme or of the NGO she worked 
for), telling me she believed most Brazilian elite 
philanthropy was motivated by a desire to main-
tain “social and market control”. Elite philan-
thropists were keen to reduce financial inequali-
ty, she said, as this was good for business. But 
they were not interested in tackling “inequality 
of participation in decision-making. They [the 
philanthropists] want to continue making the 
decisions, except that now [the poor] have mo-
bile phones, sound systems and freezers, so 
they tell them to stop complaining” (interview 
transcript, in my translation from Portuguese). 
 
Paula was a strong adherent – along with the 
founders of the programme - of the idea that 
social change begins with the raising of individ-
ual consciousness. She believed, however, that 
the programme’s founders were often too hesi-
tant to challenge the worldview of the pro-
gramme’s participants, and to include content in 
the programme that would go too far beyond 
the parameters of their own elite experience. 
The question of how and to what extent partici-
pants should be challenged to think beyond 
these parameters appeared in decision-making 
around the programme regarding everything 
from what kind of hotels should be chosen to 
accommodate participants during modules, to 
programmatic content. Paula told me in inter-
view that the programme’s founders were nerv-
ous of upsetting or shocking the young elite 
participants of the programme by introducing 
them too quickly to social and economic reali-
ties that were too challenging or too far outside 
their comfort zone, as this might lead them to 
disengage from the programme altogether. So 
while an introduction to the themes of social 
business and social investment was seen as 
appropriate content for the programme, for ex-
ample, a visit to meet members of the MST 
(Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem 
Terra – Brazil’s famous Landless Workers’ 
Movement which has campaigned for agricul-
tural reform since the 1980s) was not.  
 
While Paula understood the point of view of the 
programme’s founders, she was frustrated by 
this hesitancy to challenge their young elite cli-
ents to explore deeper and more uncomfortable 
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truths about their own role in perpetuating ine-
quality; truths such as those that might be re-
vealed during a visit to the MST, concerning the 
continuing monopolisation of Brazil’s agricultur-
al land by a small handful of elite families, and 
those families’ collusion in the historical perse-
cution of the MST by private and state mecha-
nisms for social control. In the absence of such 
challenges, Paula feared that the impact of the 
programme could be no more than “epidérmico” 
(skin deep).  
 
Paula did, however, find small ways to chal-
lenge participants further during the pro-
gramme, such as during two group discussions 
that she related to me in an interview. In one, 
she had explained to a participant who had 
pointed to Brazil’s drug trade as a source of 
social problems that this trade was in fact sus-
tained by middle- and upper-class consumption. 
In the other, she had challenged another partic-
ipant to explain how profits were achieved with-
in his own private equity firm, drawing attention 
to the relationship between poverty, unemploy-
ment, the redundancy measures central to his 
firm’s activity, and said profits. When I asked 
how he had responded, she said that he had 
gone very quiet. 
 
Interventions from Paula such as these were 
tolerated and even encouraged by the other 
leaders of the programme. Their resistance to 
Paula’s proposal for a more radical programme 
of activities seemed to be less a question of 
differing ideologies than one of concern about 
how to manage the learning process of their 
young elite clients. Juliana (not her real name), 
one of the coordinators of the programme, ex-
plained to me in an interview that participants 
came to the programme at different stages of 
their development toward becoming ‘agents of 
transformation’. While some were only just be-
ginning to develop an awareness of social is-
sues and the work of the third sector, others 
were further along in the development of their 
social consciousness, and needed more con-
tent to further their learning. Participants in a 
third stage of development were ready to trans-
form their learning into concrete action in their 
own lives, and required specific types of support 
for this. The leaders of the programme, she told 
me, had to recognise the developmental stage 
of each participant and to work with them at that 
point.  
 
This was a particularly interesting aspect of the 
programme’s work with young elite philanthro-
pists. While I sympathised fully with Paula’s 
frustration in having to treat these wealthy 
young Brazilians with kid gloves, my research 
with the programme and its participants re-
vealed the gravity of the programme’s objec-
tives of bringing about ideological and behav-
ioural change in their lives. “One thing I’ve real-
ised” Juliana told me in interview,  
 
… is that you make a really big change when 
you start to develop a new perspective on the 
world. It’s not just a change in yourself, you 
start to relate differently to your friends, to your 
family, to your employees, to everything around 
you. You need a network of people to support 
you in this process. […] Often this involves a 
rupture in relation to your family’s principles, 
and in family relationships. Sometimes it means 
going against your family’s story of construction 
[of wealth] […] Especially if you’re a person 
from our generation, you will probably encoun-
ter resistance from the generation above, from 
other people and from the wider world, because 
the whole world values accumulation [of 
wealth]. 
(my translation from Portuguese) 
 
In elite worlds where wealth and its accumula-
tion are highly valued, and where families cele-
brate historical narratives of the toil and dedica-
tion involved in the building of successful family 
businesses, criticisms of the structural inequali-
ties created and upheld by these processes are 
deeply personal. During my research in Brazil, I 
repeatedly witnessed the frustration of young 
members of the economic elite participating in 
the programme discussed above, who found 
themselves unable to bring about change within 
the board of their family’s business or philan-
thropic foundation, who were fearful of challeng-
ing the views of other family members or of go-
ing against the grain in financial or lifestyle de-
cisions dictated by family or friends. These bar-
riers to change among young members of Bra-
zil’s economic elite fed into the frustration of 
Paula (and the other coordinators of the pro-
gramme) at the slow nature of the “transfor-
mation” of many participants, or at the apparent 
failure of some participants to transform at all.  
 
So how should this programme, designed to 
encourage philanthropy and social responsibility 
among young Brazilian elites, be understood? 
Can this be seen as a real attempt to investi-
gate alternatives to global capitalism and the 
inequalities it perpetuates? And if so, does it 
represent hope for the future? The possibility of 
serious contemplation among the rich and pow-
erful of their contribution to the world’s ills and 
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of their own potential role in the creation of al-
ternative social and economic systems is cer-
tainly cause for hope. In addition, the recasting 
of philanthropy as a form of ethical salvation of 
the rich themselves is an interesting take on this 
practice, and possibly a more palatable one for 
philanthropy’s critics, even if such valiant at-
tempts are an exception to the rule within the 
broader landscape of contemporary elite philan-
thropy. 
 
The donor education programme explored 
above also shows, however, that efforts on the 
part of wealthy elites to devise alternatives to 
the current global economic system are compli-
cated by a range of factors that might not be so 
relevant to other socio-economic groups. Cen-
tral to these is the question of ideology, relating 
to different ideas about the roots of global pov-
erty and inequality, what social and economic 
change might actually look like, and how it can 
best be brought about. The acceptance of cul-
pability among wealthy and powerful elites for 
the perpetuation of global inequalities is a major 
milestone in itself, but even if this acceptance 
can be reached, it does not translate automati-
cally into transformative action. In the face of 
resistance from family members and wider elite 
communities, attempts to galvanise individuals 
into action (such as that discussed above) can 
all too easily morph into soothing forms of self-
help for guilt-ridden consciences, and ideologi-
cal converts may just return home to carry on 
their lives as usual.  
 
If anything, the programme discussed above 
shows us that the personal, the political, and 
the ideological are closely bound together in 
elite engagement with questions of social and 
economic inequality. Attempts to create change 
in collaboration with those who retain power 
and wealth need to take this interconnected-
ness into consideration. Efforts to build alterna-
tives to the current economic system from the 
top down should not be dismissed out of hand, 
not least because their potential for impact is 
huge. But such efforts are often riddled with 
complications that are not obvious to those 
standing outside elite worlds. 
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REFLECTIONS ON THE ECONOMIC, 
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 
OF NORWAY AND SCOTLAND SINCE 
180017 DRAFT 
 
By John Bryden (Research Professor with the 
Norwegian Agricultural Economics Research 
Institute (NILF), Oslo, Norway; and Professor 
Emeritus at the University of Aberdeen, Scot-
land.) 
 
Between 2012 and 2014, together with col-
leagues from Scotland, Norway, Finland, and 
England, I undertook a collaborative and inter-
disciplinary18 study of Norway and Scotland, 
two neighbouring, geographically similar, and 
historically closely linked countries, both with a 
population of around five million people. The 
question addressed was: why have Norway and 
Scotland developed in such different directions, 
and with such different impacts, since the 18th 
century?19 Two key general lessons emerge 
from this study. The first is that economic, so-
cial, and political development are both long-
term and conditioned by context, institutions, 
and power relations. We are trapped for long 
periods by path dependencies created by usual-
ly long-forgotten historical events and process-
es. Key junctures appear – albeit rather infre-
quently – in the histories of all countries and 
regions that create opportunities to change the 
rules, and break path dependencies, providing 
opportunities for significant structural changes 
that can lead to new contextual conditions20. 
The second general lesson concerns the dan-
gers of essentialist analysis of development and 
change. There are no singular, universal caus-
es of the events we observe in particular coun-
tries and regions, because people and their 
institutions have agency, and this agency cre-
ates locally adapted structures. Essentialist 
theories cannot explain structural diversity, hu-
man agency, and adaptation.  
 
At least five key structural and institutional is-
sues emerge as crucial for the analysis of dif-
                                                
17 Based on the study of Norway and Scotland since 1800, 
see Bryden et al (2015) 
18 The team included economists, historians, political sci-
entists, anthropologists, sociologists,  and geographers. 
19  Some of the differences between the two countries  
today are summarized in Table 1. 
20 For a nice comparative analysis of the Central 
American countries using path dependency and key 
junctures, see James Mahoney (2001). I am indebt-
ed to Bruno Losch for this link.  
 
ferences between Scotland and Norway. They 
concern: land and property ownership and the 
treatment of the peasantry; political power and 
its distribution among people and across territo-
ry; energy sources and the location of industry; 
class alliances and the emergence of social 
democracy; and approaches to the ownership 
and control of energy and minerals. These dif-
ferences turn out to be very interconnected, and 
immediately draw our attention to the fact that 
they transcend the disciplinary boxes within 
which most of us grow up and work. 
 
Table 1: Some facts on Norway and Scotland 
today 
 
Source: Table 1.1 in Bryden et al, 2015. 
 
A key message of the analysis is how important 
it was that Norway did not go through the 
wholesale clearance of people from the land in 
the 18th and 19th centuries, which resulted in the 
creation of a landless (and property-less and 
dependent) class in Scotland, England, Ireland 
and many other countries. These clearances 
were indeed a main feature of Scottish (as well 
as English and Irish) agrarian change and in-
dustrialization in that period, and they were only 
possible because of the political, social, and 
economic power of the few, but large-scale, 
feudal landowners. Unlike Scotland, the Norwe-
gian aristocracy and associated large-scale 
land holdings had been destroyed by the black 
death and the Kalmar Union in 139721, a situa-
tion that was compounded by the much more 
even distribution of church lands after the 
Reformation than was the case in Scotland. 
                                                
21 Signed in Kalmar, Sweden, effectively joining Norway, 
Sweden, and Denmark under the Danish crown. 
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Interestingly, Julio Berdegué and colleagues 
(2014:130) also came to similar conclusions for 
Latin America: “A history of highly unequal land 
distribution appears in many of the case studies 
as an explanatory factor for contemporary terri-
torial dynamics that tend to be exclusionary and 
sometimes polarizing”. 
  
Norway’s much more even land distribution was 
in turn the foundation of their relatively liberal 
Constitution prepared after independence from 
Denmark in 181422, and the relatively large and 
well-distributed Norwegian electorate thereafter 
when 40% of males of voting age were able to 
vote. This was roughly four times as many as in 
Scotland after the “great” reform bill of 1834, 
and it laid the foundation for Norway’s later so-
cial democracy. In addition, the (mainly small 
farmers) who wrote the Constitution wanted 
decentralized government to avoid control by a 
‘Danophile elite’ in Oslo, and thereby set the 
framework for much more local, and powerful, 
local governments than in Scotland. Later on, 
these same founding conditions, combined with 
the nature of industrialization, helped to create 
the rural-urban alliances that dominated modern 
social democratic politics. 
 
A further important and formative difference 
was that while Scotland’s industrialization was 
peopled by landless rural migrants from Scot-
land and Ireland, and fuelled by centralized coal 
deposits owned by the landed aristocracy as 
the energy resource, in Norway it was fuelled by 
decentralized hydro-electric power and peopled 
largely by farm-based “pluriactive” labour that 
remained in the rural areas. This allowed the 
small farmers and their families in many areas 
to improve their cash incomes while staying on 
the farm. In Norway the rural population re-
mained in the majority until after World War II, 
over 100 years later than the rural population in 
Scotland lost their majority. The Concession 
Acts of the early 1900s then assured that the 
revenues from hydro-electric power would 
eventually accrue to the municipalities, which 
were thus made even more powerful and effec-
tive. 
 
The small farms, and the engagement of peas-
ants and their families in small local govern-
                                                
22 Norway achieved independence from Denmark in 1814 
as a result of the Napoleonic Wars. After a few months, 
Norway was placed under the Monarchial rule of Sweden, 
but by this time it had gathered people from all over Nor-
way to write a Constitution, and thereby gained its own 
parliament as well as control over domestic policies and its 
own currency. 
ments as well as local industries, helped to fos-
ter the alliances between industrial workers and 
farmers in the 20th Century that were the foun-
dation of Norway’s strong social democracy 
and, in turn, the development of its universal 
and generous welfare state.  
 
These different characteristics and processes, 
and the values and politics that were associated 
with them, ultimately led to a very different post-
War pattern, especially during and after Mrs 
Thatcher’s Conservative government from 
1979, and in particular the very different im-
pacts of North Sea Oil. The volume produced 
by Scotland was roughly 60% of that produced 
by Norway from the North Sea, but its impacts 
were described as a “lost opportunity” and 
“fool’s gold” by two authors on the topic. At my 
last count in May 2015, Norway had accumulat-
ed just under US $1 trillion in its national Oil 
Fund (“pension fund”), whereas Scotland had 
nothing at all other than the small funds from 
landing fees accumulated by the wise Shetland 
Islands and Orkney Islands (ironically, still tech-
nically the property of Norway) which account 
for about one-thousandth part of the Norwegian 
oil fund today.  
 
The comparison confirms that economic, social, 
and political development is both long-term, and 
conditioned by context, institutions, and the 
nature and locus of economic and political pow-
er. We are trapped for long periods by path de-
pendencies created by usually long-forgotten 
historical events and processes. Moments – 
Brandel & Bratberg (2015) call them “key junc-
tures” – appear in the histories of all countries 
and regions that create opportunities to change 
the rules, and break path dependencies, provid-
ing opportunities for significant structural 
changes that can lead to new contextual condi-
tions.23 But such moments are generally quite 
rare, at least on the scale of human lifetimes. In 
the case of Scotland, the Act of Union of 1707 
stands out in sharp contrast to Norway’s inde-
pendence from Denmark in 1814. Both are criti-
cal junctures, but with very different impacts.  
The wholesale clearance of people from the 
land, and their engagement as landless labour 
in industrialization based on coal in Scotland 
during the 18th and early 19th centuries, was 
also a key juncture, standing in stark contrast to 
                                                
23 For a good comparative analysis of the Central 
American countries using path dependency and key 
junctures, see James Mahoney (2001). I am indebt-
ed to Bruno Losch for this link.  
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the empowerment and growth of the peasantry 
in Norway and its symbiotic engagement with a 
decentralized form of industrial development 
based on hydro-power in the 19th and early 20th 
centuries. A further important key juncture in 
Scotland was marked by the rise of the Liberal 
hegemony in the UK, with strong support in 
Scotland between 1880 and 1920; this was a 
period when mainland Britain’s only land reform 
before the 2000’s took place (in the form of the 
Crofting Acts), which was almost adopted for 
the whole NE of Scotland as well as the High-
lands and Islands, and a Home Rule movement 
emerged, as well as the institution of a Scottish 
Secretary in the Westminster (UK) government. 
It was a moment that was, in the event, missed, 
but it might have helped to make Scotland more 
like Norway, had it been grasped. Instead Scot-
land became subject to a long period of what 
Brandal and Bratberg term “top-down contain-
ment”. In Norway during this period, independ-
ence from the residual Swedish monarchy was 
achieved and proportional representation intro-
duced.  
 
The period between the two world wars brought 
a further key juncture to Norway in the form of 
the emerging social pacts, a consequence of 
proportional representation and resulting cross-
party coalitions, and rural-urban alliances. This 
was the foundation for the strong, universal, 
and generous social democratic welfare state in 
Norway after World War II. In Scotland mean-
while, little progress of this kind was possible 
because of the centralization of government in 
London, although small steps were taken when 
administrative devolution took place in the form 
of the moving of Scottish Office civil servants to 
Scotland in 1937.   
 
In my view the present moment is also a critical 
juncture in Scotland, with the consequences of 
devolution in 1999 and the creation of an elect-
ed Scottish parliament, which ultimately led to a 
Scottish Nationalist government in Scotland, the 
Independence Referendum of 2014, and Scot-
tish nationalist domination of Westminster seats 
in Scotland in the 2015 election. Indeed, the 
economic crisis, itself the result of the neoliberal 
hegemony since the 1970s, together with the 
“southern” shift in economic power and the re-
lated awakening of the southern giants, might 
just provide another key juncture for the world 
as a whole. One could equally argue that the 
success of the right-wing parties in forming the 
ruling coalition in Norway represents a kind of 
critical juncture there.   
 
My point, however, has been to highlight the 
rather few critical junctures in both countries 
since the early 18th century, even though it can-
not of course be said that economic, social and 
political developments did not occur in between 
(Streeck and Thelen, 2005). 
 
The contrast between Norway and Scotland 
also warns us against essentialist analysis of 
development and change. There are no singu-
lar, universal causes of the events we observe 
in particular countries and regions, because 
people and their institutions have agency, and 
this agency creates locally adapted structures. 
As McLaughlin (2012) argues, essentialism’s 
“fatal flaw is the inability of essentialist theories 
to explain structural diversity, environmental 
adaptation and human agency”. 
 
There are of course many other consequences 
and interactions in the play of history in the two 
countries, but these few observations surely 
support the need for more comparative anal-
yses of economic, social, and political develop-
ments in similar countries. In the case of Nor-
way and Scotland, the work in penetrating the 
past surely informs present day political con-
cerns – in Scotland around the independence 
and devolution debates that have transformed 
UK politics, and in Norway about the – for some 
alarming – future impacts of the Thatcherite 
policies of the present right-wing Populist-
Conservative government. 
 
The study of Norway and Scotland also reminds 
us that we always face political choices in a 
democratic society: to centralize or decentral-
ize, to privatize public services or not, to reduce 
support for local governments or increase it, to 
regulate or not, and so on. These and other 
choices have large impacts at local levels that 
can and often do dwarf the impacts of specific 
territorial policies, including rural development 
policies, and indeed often counter any positive 
economic and social impacts that these specific 
policies may have. I recently returned to exam-
ine this question in greater detail in the contem-
porary European context, but lack the space to 
cover the issue here24. 
 
  
                                                
24 In my paper for the RIMISP Mexico Conference on 
Territorial Inequalities, January 2015. I say “returned” 
because it leans on – and partly updates – the work of the 
DORA project on the dynamics of rural areas in Europe 
(See Bryden & Hart eds. 2004). 
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